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ABSTRACT 
Arab Spring is commonly associated to youth mobilization and their 
dissatisfaction with respective Arab authoritarian regimes. This empirical study explores 
such claim through tracing various social, political and demographic indicators as 
determinants of generational value change in post-2011 Egypt. It employs a generational 
perspective in discovering such values following Karl Mannheim‟s definition of 
generations. Mannheim argued that a political generation is composed of a birth cohort 
sharing similar values through a multifaceted historical process of socialization. The 
theoretical framework guiding considerable portion of this study is Ronald Inglehart‟s 
“intergenerational value change thesis.” Inglehart argues that there is an ongoing 
transnational value shift towards “postmaterialism,” which includes self-expression, 
quality of life and sense of belonging values with less emphasis on “materialist” values of 
traditionalism and security concerns. For Inglehart, younger generations are more likely 
to be postmaterialists given that their formative experiences are shaped through 
socioeconomic prosperity if compared to older cohorts.  
In this study, I aim to address central inquiry on whether youth values are 
different from their older peers and  its relevance to the 2011 events in Egypt. In doing 
so, this reaserach below, starts by inspecting the relevance of postmaterialism argument 
to Egyptian youth within international and regional contexts. Secondly, it maps out 
generational trends in relevance to political values. And finally investigate social 
parameters‟ effects aiming at scrutinizing changing youth values in post-2011 Egypt. 
Most of studies on youth in Egypt and the Middle East are yet historical or anecdotal. In 
this project below, we examine secondary data from the World Values Survey and the 
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Arab Barometer collected between 2001 and 2013. In order to untangle the unique effects 
of our proposed forecasters, we run multiple regressions instead of conventional bivariate 
associations and percentage distributions.   
On the whole, we find very limited support for Inglehart‟s thesis in explaining the 
Egyptian case. Although younger generation shows more propensities for 
postmaterialism, nevertheless the relative salience of such values is low in Egypt. We call 
for reconsidering Inglehart‟s model in developing nations. Moreover, we find evidence 
for cohort value variance in regard to some political and social values. However, part of 
these differences is related to intra-cohort aging effects. Thus, we cast doubt for the youth 
uniqueness claim and call for its refinement. Furthermore, we cast additional doubt for 
the claim on the liberal nature of young Egyptians. In addition, we find considerable 
support for youth fragmentation in Egypt. Much of the division among them is explained 
by demographic factors. Overall, this study opens the door for future qualitative studies 
through investigating our proposed criticisms and doubts on the existing claims on the 
youth distinctiveness in Egypt who agitated the 2011 uprising. 
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CHAPTER I 
The RISE OF A NEW GENERATION 
1.1 Background 
Political activism is regarded as a distinctive feature characterizing current young 
people in the world. This phenomenon has attracted scholars from diverse academic 
backgrounds to study and elucidate; particularly after the Arab spring uprisings in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Although there is plethora of studies on the 
social, economic and political milieu in which this new international generation has 
pushed through, less attention was assigned to understanding their value systems 
reflected in their means of expression and forms of engagement. This study aims to 
explore youth values in comparison to older cohorts testing the claim of their relative 
uniqueness.  
Youth values -expressed in multiple forms of sociopolitical engagement- cannot 
be exclusively restricted in MENA-related activism. In late 2014, the young in Hong 
Kong led wide protests against Beijing‟s interference in the constituency‟s 2017 chief 
executive elections regulations.
1
 This new generation that did not eyewitness the pre-
1997 British ruling settings organized through “Occupy Central” movement expressing 
their low level of trust in the Chinese government policies; according to a recent poll by 
Hong Kong‟s University public opinion program.2 In a similar vein and away from the 
east and the underdeveloped world, “Occupy” movements have swept major western 
                                                           
1
 “Hong Kong protests: The key players,‟‟ BBC World News,  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-
29408476, Retrieved October 20, 2014. 
2
 “Press Release,” Public Opinion Programme, Hong Kong University, September 23, 2014. 
http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release1186.html, Retrieved October 20, 2014.  
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capitals such as London, New York, and Paris. Described by its members as anti-
consumerist movements, these utterances of outcry pinpoint to a different category of 
modern young people who hold new set of values in terms of involvement and social 
responsibility. In New York, participants in “Occupy” movement expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the unequal income distribution and the growing role of capitalism in 
decision-making process at the federal level in the United States of America.
3
 As such, 
youth movements‟ experiences in the past decade such as “Otpor” in Serbia, “Pora” in 
Ukraine, “Kmara” in Georgia, and “Mjaft” in Albania managed to topple diverse 
authoritarian administrations; and in consequence inspired other MENA-youth 
movements like “6th of April” in Egypt to shadow their path. 
Youth expression of dissatisfaction and desire for change are central melodies in 
MENA; this region which has been always allegedly resistant to democratization.
4
 For 
example in Iran, the 2009 so-called “Green Revolution” initiated by the new generation. 
Iranian youth expressed their skepticism of election results after naming the conservative 
candidate “Ahmedi Nejad” as president.5 Although such movement brutally repressed at 
its time, it forced the conventional-religious establishment to accept moderate candidate 
                                                           
3
 Sean Captain, “Infographic: Who Is Occupy Wall Street,” FastCompany.Com, November 2, 2011. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20120719184547/http://www.fastcompany.com:80/1792056/occupy-wall-
street-demographics-infographic, Retrived October 21, 2014.  
  
4 Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative 
Perspective,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2, January 2004, pp. 139-141. 
 
5
 Tara Nesvaderani, “Iran‟s Youth: The Protests Are Not Over,” United Sates Institute of Peace, Peace 
Brief 36, June 8, 2010, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/pb36_0.pdf, Retrived October 21, 
2014. 
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“Hassan Rohani” as the new president of Iran in 2013.6 Similarly, Middle East 
democracy scholars argue that Turkey is likely to remain unstable after the June 2013 
youth protests given the unwarranted tough response from the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP)-Islamist ruling government. As consequence, recent 2015 parliamentary 
elections showed a similar trend like Iran leading to a lower turnout support for the ruling 
conservative party.
7
 
In a related vein, one can argue that political developments in Iran and Turkey are 
related to the historic 2011 youth led-mobilization in the Arab world. This led to the rise 
of question related to the distinctiveness of current Arab youth in relation to older cohorts 
who participated in earlier waves of anti-colonial activism subsequent to the World War 
II. Part of the answer related to the role of Information and Communications 
Technologies (ICTs) in helping the youth generation spreading their discontent through 
being active on the cyber space. This thesis does not dismiss such claim, although it aims 
at studying such elucidations in interplay with the changing youth values per se within a 
broad international generational replacement trend. Values of the “New Arabs” according 
to Juan Cole are historically different as they reflect a divergent level of socioeconomic 
progression in terms of excessive urbanization, cosmopolitanism and economic 
disparities, and a bulge including 60% of population across Arab states.
8
  
                                                           
6
  Bijan Khajehpour, “Iran‟s Youth Key to Elections,” Almonitor, May 31, 2013,  http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/iran-elections-youth-vote.html#, Retrived October 21, 2014.  
 
7 Joanna Slater, “Historic ousting of Erdogan‟s majority spells new uncertainty for Turkey”, The Globe and Mail, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/historic-ousting-of-erdogans-majority-spells-new-
uncertainty-for-turkey/article24846329/, Retrived June 15, 2015.  
 
8
 Juan Cole, The New Arabs: How the Millennial Generation is changing the Middle East, New York, 
Simon and Schuster, 2014, pp. 2-15. 
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Events of “Arab Spring” are the highlight of youth activism in MENA. I believe it 
is likely to be –however not exclusively- related to young Arabs value system.  
Nevertheless, it is considerably hard task to capture youth values in the region that led to 
such unprecedented mobilization. In the efforts to approach such puzzle we empirically 
map youth values based on their socioeconomic context while using Ronald Inglehart‟s 
intergenerational value change thesis as a guiding framework for comparison with other 
International young values‟ trends.9  
This study focuses on generational value differences in its focal case study 
“Egypt.” Egyptian youth are considered by many scholars to be the chief driving agent 
behind the 2011 uprising. Due to high level of unemployment and social inequality 
among young Egyptians, I believe this generation was frustrated by the political 
censorship exercised by Mubarak‟s regime. Additionally, claims have been raised on this 
generation‟s value system to be more liberal, less religious and more democratic, thus the 
2011 uprising was considered to be natural breakthrough of the domination of these 
appearances.
10
 Most importantly, in terms of demographic power, Egypt is witnessing a 
historic youth bulge; in which 62% of Egyptians are below the age of 29 reported in 
2012.
11
 This bulge is expected to last at least for the next three decades, if the current 
composition of population growth continues in a similar fashion. Based on the earlier 
                                                           
9 Ronald Inglehart and others argued extensively since the late 1970s that there is an international 
generational value change towards postmaterialist values. Based on refined version of modernization 
theory, he operationalized postmaterialism as progression towards self-expression and secular attitudes 
rather than religious and survival self-reported values.  
 
10 Ellen Knickmeyer, “The Arab World‟s Youth Army,” Foreign Policy, 27 January 2011, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/27/the-arab-worlds-youth-army-2/, Retrived June 01, 2015.  
 
11
 Egypt: Population Overview, United Nations Population Fund, 
http://egypt.unfpa.org/english/Staticpage/1/89ee0417-6c84-4410-8317-
f41518c07273/Population_and_Development.aspx, Retrived May 18, 2015. 
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mentioned facts, we believe that successive waves of youth activism in Egypt are 
expected to intensify, while treating the bulge effect as an amplifying factor for 
generational value change. 
To sum up this introductory part, such recent international waves of youth 
activism in the developed as well as the MENA region indicate the salience of youth 
phenomenon in way that was not addressed before.  Moreover, it suggests that the current 
Egyptian youth generation holds different values from older cohorts in terms of activism, 
forms of expression, and channels of political participation. In understanding such claims, 
we aim to give considerable attention to the socioeconomic context allowing youth values 
to appear in Egypt. In addition to mapping out youth value system characteristics based 
on their attitudes towards democracy, religion and gender tolerance.  
1.2 Literature Review 
At the theoretical level, there is overabundance of studies that gave special 
attention to youth, generational value replacements and characteristics of youth values in 
MENA. This part reviews related literature to intergenerational value change 
mechanisms, youth as an analytical category in the Middle East and its related 
characteristics. It aims at mapping out existing gaps when it comes to the study of the 
youth phenomenon in the Middle East, and the case of Egypt in particular.  
Dynamics of Generational Value Change 
Generational value change conceptualization is divided between two major 
schools of thought, one focuses on the life-cycle changing values, and the other bases its 
argumentation on the salience of formative experiences during early adulthood and its 
06 
 
enduring effects on youth values. Institutional and Life-Cycle school of thought bases 
its argument on stages of cognitive and biological progression through one‟s life cycle. 
This school influenced much of the research on equal-sized age cohorts in studying 
partisan identification in the United States and Europe treating those effects as systematic 
ones.
12
 Other scholars looked on the interplay between aging processes and socialization. 
As the person ages, his attitudes become more rigid and conservative, due to the loss of 
social status, i.e. the lesser ability for interaction with others due to pure biological 
reasons such as cognitive disabilities.
 
 Similar evidence is found in the “disengagement 
theory.” It suggests that when individuals grow old, they tend to be more restricted in 
terms of group membership and interaction with others, either voluntarily or due to 
societal conducts.  
Another possible explanation for the effect of age is by controlling for the 
variable of experience. As young people usually do not have enough experience coining 
their attitudes to be more optimistic. Other institutional theories focus on “the relearning 
alignment process,” where individuals change their opinions and attitudes through their 
life cycles disregarding the prominence of childhood and early adulthood socialization.
13
  
However, empirical research does not fully support the continuity of early formed 
attitudes over successive life stages as cultural theorists suggest.
 14 
 
                                                           
12
 Michael X. Delli Carpini, Political Learning in Adulthood: A Sourcebook of Theory and Research, 
Robert S. Sigel (editor), Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1989, pp. 16-20. 
 
13
 Joseph R. Demartini, "Change Agents and Generational Relationships: A Re-evaluation of Mannheim's 
Problem of Generations," Special Forces, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 4-12.  
  
14
 M. Kent Jennings, Political Knowledge Over Time and Across Generations," The Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 2, 1996, pp. 228-252.   
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In another vein, other set of studies underlines Cultural and Political 
Socialization explanations in shaping attitudes and their change. Talcott Parsons and 
Edward Shils argued that any given political system holds embedded group of sentiments 
and manifestations within; reflected on its public through their value system and roles in 
the polity afterwards.
15
 Similarly, Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba in their study of 
civic culture mapped the operational components of society's political culture to include 
cognitive, affective and evaluational attitudes towards their role and the general political 
system per se, thus shaping individuals‟ attitudes and consequently their forms of 
political engagement.
16
 In the same line, James Scott studied the relationship between 
political culture and individual's political behavior and program of action.
 17
  Scott argued 
that it can be best explained through mechanisms of political socialization.  
Cultural theories stress on the process of political learning through which 
generations undergo subsequent phases of political socialization.  David Easton and 
Robert Hess suggested that the process of political socialization starts in the early stages 
of childhood at the age of three through family, and the schooling system. However, such 
forms of socialization do not yield symmetric effects on the same birth cohort.
18
 
Moreover, David Sears and others noted the importance of education in attitude 
formation that shapes the persistence of the ideological way of thinking with little change 
                                                           
15
 Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, Towards a General Theory of Action, Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1951, pp. 59-60. 
 
16
 Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963, p.15.  
 
17
 James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia: Reality and the Beliefs of an Elite, Connecticut, Yale 
University Press, 1968, pp. 35-48.  
 
18
  David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "A Child's Political World," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 
Vol. 6, August 1962, p. 236. 
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over time.
19
 Fred Greenstein noted that attitudes are formulated at a very young age, but 
its ramifications and effects are shaped through adulthood-learning phase, as it works as 
"filters" for any subsequent kind of knowledge a person may acquire.
20
  
The study of generations was developed mainly through Karl Mannheim‟s classic 
writings. Mannheim argued that political generations came to existence through a 
complex historical-social process of socialization.
21
 The impressionable years‟ hypothesis 
was ultimately coined with the efforts of Theodore Newcomb and Norman Ryder based 
on Mannheim‟s earlier explanation.22 Both scholars argued that individuals of the same 
birth cohorts aging tentatively between eighteen and twenty-five in their formative years 
are most likely to share the same political attitudes if witnessed a salient political event. 
Thus, this particular age cohort represents a distinctive political generation, and probably 
differs from other generations. Later on, Howard Schuman and others argued that 
attitudes fluctuate during youth time, then enters stability stage afterwards, thus they do 
not completely support the earlier proposition on attitudinal stability among birth 
cohorts.
23
 On the contrary, Paul DiMaggio and Ronald Inglehart stress the weight on 
                                                           
19
 David O. Sears, "Life-Stage Effects on Attitude Change, especially among the Elderly," in Sara B. 
Kiesler, James N. Morgan, and Valerie Kincade Oppenheimer (editors), Aging: Social Change, New York, 
Academic Press, 1981, pp. 185-200. 
 
20
 Freed Greenstein, "The Political Socialization," The International Encyclopedia of the Social Science, 
New York, Macmillan, 1968, Vol. 14, pp. 551-555. 
 
21
 Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations," in Paul Kecskemeti (editor), Essays on the sociology of 
Knowledge, London, Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1952, pp. 281-310. 
 
22
 Norman Ryder, "The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change," American Sociological 
Review, 30, 1965, pp. 849-852. 
 
23
 Howard Schuman and Amy D. Corning, "Collective Knowledge of Public Events: The Soviet Era from 
the Great Purge to Glasnost," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 105, No. 4, January 2000, pp. 933-946. 
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attitudes and memories on salient political events in early adulthood that is likely to 
persist after fluctuations to form certain characteristics of a given political generation.
24
  
On the other hand, Nicholas Danigelis and others found that not all political 
events qualify to be salient to add to the coining of political attitudes among certain age 
cohorts.
25
 In the same line, Kent Jennings tackled the salience nature of political events, 
relating it to its "visibility" for a certain birth cohort in their formative years.
26
 Therefore, 
Inglehart and others highlighted the need for careful cross-sectional intergenerational 
analysis as inter-cohort differences is more present in advanced societies than developing 
ones, due to the unstable political circumstances they pass through leaving no space for 
salient political events, as many can be considered as such.
27
  
Inglehart‟s efforts in producing the Euro barometer and the World Values Survey 
(WVS) later on are considered major contribution to the study of generations based on 
the gradual accumulative socioeconomic progression thesis. This line of thought rejects 
Mannheim‟s stance on the effect of salient events in shaping long-lasting political 
attitudes.
28
 Inglehart through his scholarship on value change in Western developed 
states, noted that there is a silent revolution tacking place allowing for a generational 
value change causing the emergence of postmaterialist values of self-expression and 
                                                           
24
 Paul DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 23, 1997, pp. 270-280.  
 
25
 Nicholas L. Danigelis, Melissa Hardy and Stephen J. Cutler, "Population Aging, Intracohort Aging, and 
Sociopolitical Attitudes," American Sociological Review, Vol. 72, No. 5, October, 2007, pp. 812-825. 
 
26
 M. Kent Jennings, "Residues of a Movement: The Aging of the American Protest Generation," The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 2, June, 1987, pp. 367-372. 
 
27
 Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker , "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of 
Traditional Values, "American Sociological Review, Vol. 65, No. 1, February 2000,  pp. 30-34. 
 
28
 Ronald Inglehart, “The Renaissance of Political Culture.” American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, 
1988, No. 4, pp.103-110. 
 
21 
 
secularism among younger birth cohorts born after the World War II.
29
 Moreover, 
Inglehart rejected the role of aging or life-cycle effects. Simultaneously, he noted the 
theoretical difficulty in distinguishing between cohort, period, and life-cycle effects even 
statistically-wise.
30
 Accordingly, for elaborating the cohort effects, it needs a suitable 
theoretical background to control or rule out the other effects for suitable understanding. 
Youth Characteristics in the Middle East  
Youth bulge in the Middle East is growing intensively, with sixty percent of the 
population below the age of thirty, and more than half of the people fall below the age of 
twenty-five; that is twice the corresponding age category in North America.
31
. The 
segments below cover youth features and its usage as an analytical concept in the Middle 
East. 
In his book, Tarik Yousef and Navtej Dhillon focused on the social grievances 
that unite the youth in MENA, arguing that such category is socially marginalized, thus 
contributing to their coherent collective action which affects the policy-making 
processes. 
32
 The same line of thought is present internationally; Johanna Wyn stressed 
the policy-implications that affect the youth as social category, accompanied by the shift 
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towards capitalist forms of policies in the western societies since the 1980s.
33
 Wyn 
looked at the youth through their reactions to such policy implications in the fields of 
education, health, and labor. Since the 1970s, the study of political generations in MENA 
highlighted the youth as active agents bringing up change in ways never expected 
before.
34
 This post-independence generation who are more educated, and urbanized are 
willing to determine the fate of their societies. Thus, the young are the main pillar for 
post-colonial political settings in MENA. Projecting such conception on the modern 
developments, Bahgat Korany noted the importance of youth activism as unique 
phenomenon adopting a social movement‟s theory (SMT) which encompasses 
mobilization, political opportunity structure (POS), and framing.
35
 Similarity, Dina 
Shehata acknowledged the youth mobilization in the Egyptian 2011 uprising, arguing that 
their organization is integral to understand the dynamics of such events, as a part of a 
general Egyptian social movement.
36
 
On the other hand, other scholars overlooked the youth as an analytical category 
in relation to the Arab Spring events and in part as primary source of change. John 
Chalcraft extended his disagreement to oppose the "exclusive" linkage between Arab 
Uprisings and youth, while undermining the role of new forms of social media such as 
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"Facebook" in mobilizing these mass uprisings.
37
 In the same line, Kastrinou 
Theodoropoulou argued that using youth as analytical unit is of no theoretical 
significance as it renders different types of resistance and struggle into a nominal holistic 
building unit.
38
 Asef Bayat‟s work on Islamists Movements in MENA suggested an 
alternative view. Bayat employed Bourdieu‟s position on the manipulative nature of the 
concept of youth; as it does not represent a single category. Thus, it needs a deep 
examination. Consequently, Bayat proposed a youth-sensitive approach rather than 
treating the youth as a distinct analytical category.
39
  
Nevertheless this intense debate on youth in MENA, the generational replacement 
perspective is overlooked.
40
 It was only mentioned back in 2009 through Fahmy 
Hewidy‟s induction on the Egyptian youth reactions towards political conflict with 
Algeria over a sports event.
41
 Likewise, Emma Murphy in the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring adopted the conception of generations through the study of youth and their value 
system to explain their activism. 
42
 According to Murphy, young generation in the region 
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are different from their older peers, in terms of expressing their opinions, tools used, and 
their rejection of the “failed” Arab states in which they live in. 
 In the same line, other scholars argued that current MENA youth activism waves 
are reaction to deliberalizing respective political public spheres.
43
 Youth being left out of 
formal political channels, found in cyber space a parallel platform to express their 
opinions and voice out their dissatisfaction spontaneously away from state censorship. 
They transformed social media into active political recruitment venue leading to the 
historic 2011 mobilization. Moreover, other scholars like John Esposito argued that the 
Arab Spring was even an expression of distrust within the mainstream opposition 
movements, particularly the Islamists.
44
 Arab spring at that time as imagined to be led by 
liberal young Arabs who seek to democracy rather than establishing Islamic-oriented 
political systems based on the failures of Islamic experiences in Iran, Sudan, and 
Afghanistan.  
On the other hand, recent studies showed that youth in the Middle East despite 
their online activism and international exposure; they lack sense of political organization 
and modern values.
45
 Such readings showed that Arab youth identify themselves as 
traditional-religious with high focus on subnational-tribal loyalties. Moreover, several 
elections‟ experiences in post-2011 settings showed that Arab youth are not politically 
organized to impact decision-making in their respective societies. For instance in Egypt, 
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following Mubarak‟s ouster, more than 140 political youth coalitions appeared on the 
scene; nonetheless they failed to agree on a joint list running for the 2011 parliamentary 
elections. As a result Islamists got 72% of the total turnout vote. Between the earlier 
presented narratives, this study is trying to map out youth values in chronological context 
in the Egyptian case to test such claims employing an empirical perspective.  
1.3 Contextualizing Egyptian Youth  
In theory, Egyptian youth are considered the critical mass to determine the future 
dynamics of politics as James Mattson argued on his scholarship on Arab political 
generations in the 1970s.
46
 In post-2011 settings, questions of legitimacy, income 
distribution, and social equality are critical for stability in Egypt. This study is trying to 
explore the current features of Egyptian youth and whether their changing values qualify 
to provide answers for the 2011 events and predict the potential route of politics in Egypt. 
In order to do such task, this section portrays youth demographics and their context of 
political socialization.  
Demographic Characteristics 
One of the major defining features of Egyptian youth is their relative size; 
composing a historic bulge that Egypt never witnessed before. Several indicators help in 
emphasizing such claim.  62% of Egyptians are below the age of 29 as reported in 2012.
47
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Moreover, the average age of total Egyptian population is 25.1 years.
48
 Reported total 
fertility rate  is 2.79 between (2010- 2015) in comparison to 5.2 during the period of 
(1980- 1985).
50
 Population growth rate was decreasing during (1980-1985) at 2.28 %.
51
 It 
decreased to be 1.56% during the 1990s, and rose slightly to be 1.68% during (2005-
2010), however it expected to decline and reach 0.69% in (2045-2050). Although fertility 
and population growth rates are declining; life expectancy rate is increasing over time 
reaching 73.45 years in 2014. All of that is reflected on Egypt‟s population pyramid in 
figures (1.1- 1.3); the wide skewed bases signaling youth population are obvious in 
figures 1.1 and 1.2, while it is expected to narrow down by (2045- 2050) as shown in 
figure 1.3.
52
  
Figure 1.1 Egypt‟s Population Pyramid in 2000 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
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Figure 1.2 Egypt‟s Population Pyramid in 2014 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau  
 
Figure 1.3 Egypt‟s Population Pyramid in 2045 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
As shown in the above figures, current Egyptian youth cohort is demographically 
overrepresented and expected to be in such case over the next three decades at least. We 
argue that Egypt‟s youth population values are vital for any potential political 
arrangements in the country. Moreover, Egypt‟s current political generation is more 
urban and educated. Although present population distribution is inclined towards rural 
sort of residency, yet the internal migration waves towards urban parts of the country are 
obvious in the last two decades.  Rural-Urban migration is estimated to be around 13.1% 
of total population movement between 1986 and 1996; however these numbers are 
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defining feature of Egyptian population if compared to growth rates at the time.
 53
 
Moreover, inter-urban migration is the highest during Egypt‟s recent history; it ranges 
between 64.3% at 1976 to 60.4% according to the 1996 census. 
 In terms of education, youth literacy rate
54
 increased dramatically to reach 
87.51% in 2010 in comparison to 51.03 % in 1976.
55
 Moreover, total number of enrolled 
students at higher education institutes in Egypt was around 2.02 million students in 2004, 
with 49% females.
56
 In addition, it is not only the gross number of enrollment at different 
schooling levels that matters; however the content and quality of education is very 
indicative per se. Along with private and international schools for primary and secondary 
education; Egyptian public universities during the mid-1990s developed special 
language-based programs to privatize education and increase its quality. Therefore, there 
is a qualitative improvement in addition to the quantitative progression in Egyptian 
educational system.  
Young Egyptians now are more connected to the world through cyber 
engagement. It resulted in creating parallel-virtual political spheres in which they act and 
express freely in away from the formal restricted conventional public sphere. One 
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indicator for that is internet usage in Egypt.
57
 It is estimated that about 40 million 
Egyptians use internet during July 2014.
58
 Internet usage increased by 490% between 
2002 and 2005, and then fluctuating at the 30-40% level till it reached relative stagnation 
at 10% from 2013 to 2014. In addition, it is estimated that there are more than 100 
million mobile subscribers in Egypt with average 17% annual growth in this booming 
sector.
59
 Moreover, 10.87% of those users are estimated to use mobile internet in August 
2012. Social media networks are very popular in Egypt; “Facebook” is the most used 
with total penetration rate of 16.5% in 2014.
60
 Egypt‟s active “Facebook” users are 
estimated to be about 12.9 million in 2014 and “Twitter” users are 510,000 thousands 
during the same period. It is important to mention that Egypt‟s social media share is the 
highest within the Arab world with about 24%.   
Political Socialization of Egypt’s Millennial Youth  
Egypt‟s millennial political generation has pushed through certain sociopolitical 
context that differs structurally from their older peers. Most of literature on political 
socialization focuses on age between 11 and 15 years old in the person‟s life; being 
regarded as the starting point to encounter politics.
61
 Thus, if we take Egypt‟s generation 
aging between (18- 35) between 2000 and 2013 as the data in hand entails; their 
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formative political period ranges through 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s. Thus, we aim in 
this section to elaborate the context in which current Egypt‟s youth have pushed through. 
An important feature of Egypt‟s political history in the last three decades is the 
role of its ruler Hosni Mubarak; although the political system was designed as “semi-
presidential” according to the 1971 constitution, however in reality it was a one-man 
show. Egypt‟s political system under Mubarak was characterized mainly by stagnation; I 
would owe much of that to the Mubarak‟s personal characteristics who is considered to 
be the longest serving ruler of Egypt since 1850.
62
 That was reflected on providing no 
hope for successive political generations in Egypt. 
 1980s was marked by Egypt‟s isolation from its Arab milieu following the peace 
agreement with Israel in 1978. Like his predecessor (Anwar Al-Sadat), Mubarak 
continued his liberal-economic policies with a desire to end the gigantic foreign external 
debt Egypt faced at the time. On the other hand, his early promises on political 
liberalization were proved wrong; two successive parliaments were dissolved in 1987 and 
1990 respectively with the danger of Islamic insurgency in horizon. At the same time, he 
kept ruling the country under emergency law that eliminates nearly all sorts of political 
opposition and freedom of expression.
63
  
During the 1990s, securitization of public sphere was prioritized over political 
bargaining. Faced with the threat of Islamist insurgencies, Mubarak relied on security 
forces to deal with waves of terrorism and sectarian violence. Many assassination 
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attempts for liberal figures were in display, such as the head of parliament professor Dr. 
Refa‟at al-Mahgoub and Farag Fouda, a political liberal writer who publicly criticized 
Islamist-Jihadi groups. Even Mubarak himself survived an assassination attempt in 
Ethiopia in 1995. 
64
 At the same time, Egypt started its “privatization” program in 1991 
to treat its mal-functioning economy.
65
 However, by the end of the twentieth century, 
Egypt‟s debt doubled with high rate of unemployment due to the inefficient handling of 
the privatization program.  
During the 2000s, it was Mubarak‟s third term in power, and started containing 
political opposition in various ways, following Albrecht and Schlumberger‟s 
“liberalization/de- liberalization” explanation.66 Both scholars argued that after promises 
for political openness, authoritarian rulers restrict political freedoms in their route to 
sustain their power. Furthermore, the visibility of Gamal Mubarak –Mubarak‟s son- in 
politics further instigated public discontent; coupled with the rise of his capitalist 
coalition that ruled Egypt through Ahmed Nazif‟s government from 2004 to 2011. 
Another important development is the reaction towards major catastrophes and corruption 
cases that Egypt faced during mid-2000s. In early 2006, the “MS al-Salam Boccaccio 98” 
Egyptian ferry sank in the red sea, leaving about 1400 deaths.
67
 The government did not 
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react and the ferry owner was allowed to escape the country after allegations of his 
relation to Gamal Mubarak and his membership in the ruling National Democratic Party 
(NDP) heading committee.  
It is obvious that circumstances surrounding youth political socialization since the 
1980s are turbulent and likely to affect their behavior and value expressions. I would 
argue that one important feature of Egypt‟s history under Mubarak is the “condition of 
uncertainty,” shared by many of Egyptians, particularly the youth.  As the political 
system restricted prospects of reform and youth‟s future were dependent on one person 
who never mapped out a clear path for the future. I believe that such condition led to the 
2011 mobilization that aimed to put an end to such cognitive danger.  
1.4 Inglehart’s Value Change Thesis 
In this section, I present the guiding framework that influenced much of this study 
in principle. Following the World War II; competing paradigms of modernization and 
dependency aiming to accelerate economic development were in display. Modernization 
theory with its linear evolutionary laws was criticized heavily by the dependency school 
that the “metropolis” or international western capitalism is the main reason for the 
underdevelopment happening in the periphery states.
 68 
However, the post-cold war epoch 
coupled with the rise of South East Asian economies regained credibility in the 
modernization view. From this ontological perspective, Inglehart‟s work stems out. 
However, Inglehart rejected some of the simplistic laws of modernization in his works 
after the 1990s.  He considered social and culture changes owed to modernization as 
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path-dependent. Moreover, such evolutionary changes are yet to take place in the long-
term development of a given society. Thus, Inglehart though criticizing traditional 
modernization view, he can still be considered as a strong believer in modernization 
effects in a prolonged manner. Modernization is the dominant approach to the study of 
values in the literature. However, this research utilizes it as an outlining frame to 
approach its problematic inquiry. In another words, modernization help us in 
understanding the casual mechanisms behind values formulation and change. However, 
we argue through it this reaserach that the universal views of modernization do not hold 
right in explaining all youth values in Egypt. Furthermore, we add several assumptions 
from the literature to further adjust Inglehart‟s original thesis and help us in our study 
quest.  
Inglehart based his changing values thesis on the Maslowan notion of hierarchy of 
needs.
69
 Abraham Maslow noted that physiological needs are satisfied in a hierarchal 
progressive way from the lower order to the highest rank.
70
 Drawing on such conception; 
Inglehart‟s hypothesis argues that there is a “postmaterialist” value shift among younger 
generations whose formative years‟ formulated after World War II due to unprecedented 
economic prosperity. For older cohorts born before the war, economic threats raised 
safety needs. However, younger cohorts‟ priorities are coined by set of “post-bourgeois” 
values reflecting needs for belonging and intellectual expression demands.
71
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Inglehart‟s thesis is based on the primacy of the causality between socioeconomic 
development and generational value change. As socioeconomic progress changes 
society‟s substantial basis and its social fabric, it is directly tied the conception of 
existential security. Inglehart agrees with Milton Rokeach‟s definition of values as the 
desirable modes of conduct that shape human goals, therefore affect one‟s behavior.72 
Moreover, cultural anthropologists like Durham and others consider value change to be 
an evolutionary process as reflective for the prevailing conditions of existence.
 73
 This 
understanding adopted by Inglehart entails that value orientations reflect existential living 
conditions. Moreover, if these conditions are to change, values will change as well but in 
a prolonged-time lag after the experience of new life strategies and conditions. Such 
change is arguably to be adopted by the young more than the elderly, as the latter hardly 
abandon their surviving traditions and ontological views, but once the new life strategies 
merge with new modes of thinking, the young will adapt with their new existential 
conditions.  
Moreover, socioeconomic development reduces constraints on the human abilities 
in terms of independence, imagination and choice.
74
 As it decreases material constraints 
on human options and elevates the level of existential security, coupled with the increase 
in the level of formal education, and access to information through different forms of 
media. In addition, it increases working specialization and social involvedness which is 
reflected on more diversified human interactions.  
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Industrialization initiates bureaucratization and secularization, while the 
movement towards post-industrialization emphasizes individual autonomy and self-
expression values. These cultural changes reshape people‟s political orientations towards 
authority, but rather in different ways.
75
 The shift in human values accompanying the 
industrialization phase is attributed to the breakthrough in technology and different 
means of control over human conditions. As in pre-industrial societies, it was a game 
against nature, while in industrial societies, the control over nature and production 
decreased the role assigned to religious beliefs, as materialistic ideologies gave raise to 
secular interpretations of history and increased emphasis on human created bureaucratic 
organizations. Thus, the shift towards secular values from traditional religious beliefs is 
likely to occur. 
 In the process of post-industrialization, production outcomes are not yet material; 
rather they are in forms of ideas, innovative services and knowledge. In addition the 
mode of occupational division is not mechanical anymore; rather it occurs through an 
organic working environment. Hence, progression of existential economic conditions is 
more profound than in the industrialization phase; consequently changed people‟s values 
in a different way. This emancipative process allowed people to be more autonomous, 
with more options, and skeptic of authority.  
The prevalence of post-materialist values is not a universal phenomenon. 
Different nations experience different levels and patterns of technological and economic 
change, the emerging postmaterialist values are likely to prevail mainly in developed 
nations. This takes us to the Egyptian case, as well as the cases of other developing 
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nations where the uneven socioeconomic development values effects within the same 
generation is not accounted exclusively for Inglehart‟s thesis.  
Adjusting Inglehart’s Thesis 
This thesis‟s quest is to test Inglehart‟s intergenerational value change hypothesis 
in the developing context of post-2011 Egypt. Moreover, this thesis explores the presence 
of post-materialist values among Egyptian societal sectors while acknowledging that 
reactionary stances towards such expected values shift are prevalent among other 
segments of the society. 
Inglehart's thesis overlooks the effects of persistent cultural traits including 
religion, and the scholarship on pre-materialist values in terms of political socialization in 
which socioeconomic progression is relatively low. This thesis attempts to broaden the 
analysis through the inclusion of these kinds of effects.  Hence, this study is trying to 
further problematize such value change thesis in the developing world by accounting for 
the role of political attitudes and social values in explaining generational differences.  
Samir Amin  argued that Egypt historically did not enter the international 
capitalist system until the national bourgeois imposed revised division of labor on 
imperial power. With such process, and the uneven industrialization effects led to the 
creation of “developed pockets,” within the developing economy. Thus, projecting that 
on this reaserach, we expect to find that the Egyptian society still contain such developed 
pockets attached to the international capitalist economy and in turn more globalized in 
the modern sense, while other segments are marginalized based on their relative 
socioeconomic status within this dual industrialized process. This entails different levels 
of socioeconomic development and consequently value holdings. Consequently, we 
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expect to find varying effects for economic development among specific sectors, while 
most of Egyptians still relate themselves to traditional-materialist values and that goes for 
the youth as well. Finally, the thesisthesis below considers Inglehart‟s framework only as 
a guiding outline for the study of intergenerational value change in Egypt, however I tend 
to use other political and social indicators to map out Egyptian youth values and explain 
existing cohort differences.  
1.5 Problematization and Objectives 
This study‟s subsequent sections and chapters base its analysis of youth values on 
the conception of political generation. A generation which is defined subjectively as 
members of the same birth cohort –following Mannheim‟s definition- qualifies to explain 
changing values in the Egyptian case. Our main inquiry in this study is to answer the 
following question: 
“Are youth political values different from older generation(s)? If they are 
different; in which manner?”  
By integrating Inglehart‟s typology of postmaterialist versus materialist values 
thesis, we develop another set of sub-questions: 
- Do the same pattern(s) of youth values in the developed world hold for Egypt? 
-  Can Inglehart‟s typology explain youth values in Egypt? If not, what are the 
main values that help in explaining cohort differences?  
Furthermore, Egyptian youth values are perceived to be fragmented, i.e. not 
holding the same value patterns due to the internal socioeconomic variations, and effects 
of different stratifiers like class-system, education level, gender, place of residency, and 
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religion. For example, while some Egyptian youth hold post-materialist values, others go 
ultra-conservative joining the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) or Jerusalem Supporters 
(JS). Also, the thesis aim at explaining the 2011 uprising in Egypt, through posing the 
following questions: 
1. What are the underlying factors that drive Egyptian youth in different 
directions? 
2. Can the events of January 2011 in Egypt be explained by changing youth 
values? 
In addition to the qualitative reasoning used throughout this thesis‟s sections, it 
mainly relies on empirical demonstration of youth values using various data-sets based on 
its availability. In that sense, I depend on the following main hypotheses:  
Hypothesis A: Youth holds different political values than older generations both 
in Egypt and the world. 
Hypothesis B: The structure of youth values in Egypt is different from other 
societies 
Hypothesis C: Egyptian youth values are fragmented due to uneven effects of 
socioeconomic development, where the increase in socioeconomic status is associated to 
higher expressions of postmaterialist values.  
Hypothesis D: Religion is essential in explaining youth values trends in Egypt, 
where higher levels of religiosity are likely to yield traditional-material values  
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Objectives  
This study takes up the mission of realizing the following interrelated goals: 
i) Applying the generational perspective to map the Egyptian youth values in the 
new millennium that led ultimately to the January 2011 events. 
ii) It attempts to cluster Egyptian youth value trends in comparison to older 
generations and to the mainstream trajectories of international youth through 
employing Roland Inglehart‟s intergenerational value change thesis.  
iii) The study‟s contribution is yet an analytical one tackling the issue of the 
youth from an empirical/generational perspective that is under-researched in 
this part of the world. 
iv)  It contributes to the literature on democratization in MENA through mapping 
Egyptian youth values related to democratization, political Islam, and gender 
equality. Thus, to foresee effects of youth on democratic potential in Egypt. 
1.6 Data and Methodology 
This study is using secondary data from five different surveys conducted in Egypt 
during the period between July 2000 and March 2013. Data sources are respectively; the 
World Values Survey (WVS), the Arab Barometer (AB). All of these data sets are free to 
use according to the agreement conditions on each of the above reaserach project 
websites.  Data characteristics are shown in Table 1.1:  
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Table 1.1 Survey Data on Egypt between 2000 and 2013 
 
 
Project Sample Size Survey Date Response 
Rate 
Estimated 
Error 
Data Collection 
Agency 
WVS 
Wave 4
78
 
 
3000 July 2000-
January 2001 
N/A +/- 1.8 % EMAC Research 
and Training 
WVS 
Wave 5
79
 
 
3051 March- April 
2008 
N/A N/A Survey Unit at 
IDSC 
WVS 
Wave 6
80
  
 
1523 March- April 
2012 
N/A +/- 2.6 % TNS Egypt 
AB 
Wave II
81
 
 
1200 June 2011 100% +/- 3 % Al-Ahram Center  
(ACPSS) 
AB 
Wave III
82
 
1200 February- 
March 2013 
71.6% +/- 2.8 % Mada Foundation  
Note: Since not all of the above data sets are probably weighted, we weighted the WVS 
4, 5, and 6 datasets around the 2006 Egypt‟s census demographic characteristics issued by the 
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). 
83
 
 
As per the mathematical definition of political generations, we used a mediatory 
method to define youth in relevance to the data hand. The Population Council which 
conducted the Survey of Young People in Egypt defines this category to include those 
                                                           
78  Egypt 2001, WVS Wave 4 (1999-2004), World Values Survey Website, 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV4.jsp, Retrived March 13, 2013.  
 
79 Egypt 2008, WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009), World Values Survey Website, 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp, Retrived March 20, 2013.  
 
80 Egypt 2012, WVS Wave 6 (2010-2014), World Values Survey Website, 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp, Retrived January 3, 2015.  
 
81 Arab Barometer Wave II, http://www.arabbarometer.org/instruments-and-data-files, Retrived June 15, 
2014.  
 
82 Arab Barometer Wave III (2012-2014), http://www.arabbarometer.org/instruments-and-data-files, 
Retrived June 15, 2015.  
 
83  Census Data, CAPMAS, http://www.censusinfo.capmas.gov.eg/, Retrived October 10, 2014.  
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between the ages of (15-29).
84
 On the Other hand, Mannheim's conception of the young's 
formative years to be between the ages of (18-25), whereas the individual transcends to 
the adulthood phase, and starts facing reality. While Mark Tessler in his study on 
Morocco‟s political generations set the age of 35 years to be the threshold between 
younger and older political generations. We used a mediatory technique to count for 
generational gabs ranging between (10-14-19) years in the attempt to produce more stable 
attitude analysis over the different waves of surveys in use.  Hence, in exploring 
postmaterialism values, I defined the youth as those falling within the age bracket of (16-
30) following the CAPMAS weights in hand of the WVS on Egypt, while in assessing 
political, religious and social attitudes; I used a range of (18-35) to explain youthful 
orientations due to the weights of the AB II and III .  
 
Method of Analysis 
Throughout the research below, we rely on multiple approaches of analysis, given 
that there is no single indicator, or analytical method can solely explain a social 
complicated phenomenon such as attitude formation and value change.  
In analytical empirical discussions, we used several dependent, independent, 
control and interaction variables using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models 
in order to explain the effect of different predictors on our parameters that reflect youth 
values in Egypt over survey pools. In addition, for the sake of constructing world and 
regional maps of postmaterialism, I used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) in which 
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 SYPE 2009 Final Report, The population Council. 
www.popcouncil.org/uploads/pdfs/2010PGY_SYPEFinalReport.pdf. Retrived August 27, 2014.  
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common features reflecting Inglehart‟s typologies where derived from country mean 
scores. I used both SPSS and STATA statistical applications in all the following analyses. 
In conclusion, this study follows the subsequent line of inquiry; I first examine the 
trends of postmaterialist values in the world at the present moment and its relevance to 
Egyptian youth. I show how Egyptian youth values patterns are placed in their regional 
and global contexts. Then, I provide different manifestations on youth‟s political value 
differences in terms of trust, efficacy, and democracy and possible explanations for such 
trends. Moreover, I project the role of religiosity on Egyptian youth and its effects on 
activism and gender tolerance.  Finally, I project youth value change and it relevance to 
the Arab Spring events and account for fragmentation among the young in Egypt.  
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CHAPTER II 
POSTMATERIALISM IN EGYPT 
In this chapter, I aim to place postmaterialist value portfolio in Egypt within its 
global and regional contexts. In sections below, I explain thoroughly the underpinnings of 
such values and its current status in the world, producing a world cultural map 
complementing the earlier work presented by Inglehart. Then, I trace value shift in the 
Middle East based on socioeconomic causality. Finally, I provide insights on the level of 
postmaterialism among Egyptian youth and its main predictors.   
2.1 Postmaterialism in a Comparative Perspective 
The causal relation amongst social, economic and political vicissitudes is integral 
in the literature of social sciences. Ever since the Marxist doctrine on the primacy of 
economic infrastructure in shaping values and norms; this controversial debate never was 
outdated. Although a Marxist proletarian class never ruled out in due course of history, 
yet the primacy of socioeconomic causation implies some degree of predictably on the 
mode of global value change. This section aims at portraying the structure of 
postmaterialist values at the turn of the new millennium in a comparative perspective to 
serve as a starter to detect such trend in Egypt afterwards.  This work is one hand novel in 
the context of the Middle East. In addition, it adds to the already existing earlier cultural 
maps developed by Inglehart and Welzel before.  
Modernization Theory: Re-visited  
For Karl Marx, production relations within class-systems are the infrastructure in 
any given society that influences the superstructure including state, culture, and legalities 
that reflects interests of a given dominant class, and through process of class-antagonism, 
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change is achieved.
 86
 On the contrary, Emile Durkheim who is more of a sociologist was 
concerned with studying the patterns of stability than change in respective societies.
87
. In 
another line of thought, Max Weber confronted both Marx and Durkheim arguing that 
ideas can actually shape economic conditions under specific conditions through the 
introduction of the concept of “Verstehen” or understanding in German.88 Weber noted 
that through understanding the motivations behind actions, ideas can influence economic 
and political behavior. Still, recent inputs from scholars like Samuel Huntington, Robert 
Putnam, and Francis Fukuyama noted that regardless any kind of socioeconomic cultural 
variations caused by industrialization, cultural traditions are persistent mainly in orthodox 
societies and ultimately shape economic and political behavior per se.
89
  
Postwar underdevelopment in the south is owed to the persistence of traditional 
economy, psychological and cultural traits in any given society.
90
 Thus, for any given 
society to develop, it has to follow the western capitalist model of modernization. 
However other neo-structuralist scholars, such as Wallerstein, regarded modernization as 
an outdated explanation of the underdevelopment in poor countries.
91
 The postwar 
modernization version failed to account for the external causes of underdevelopment. 
World-systems theorists owed the uneven center-periphery socioeconomic development 
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 Karl Marx, “The German Ideology.” In The Mm-Engels Reader, Robert C. Tucker (editor), second 
edition, New York, W.W. Norton, 1978, pp. 155-175. 
 
87
 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, New York, The Free Press, 1997. 
 
88
 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, London, Routledge, 1993. 
 
89
 Paul DiMaggio, “Culture and Economy,” In Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg (editors.), The 
Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 27–57. 
 
90
 Daniel Lerner, Passing Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, New York, Free Press, 1958.  
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 Immanuel Wellerstein, “Modernization: Requiescat in Pace,” in The Uses of Controversy in Sociology, L. 
A. Coser and O. N. Larsen (editors), New York, Free Press, pp. 130-132.  
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to the exploitation of world capitalism.
92
  However, such perception has been under 
criticism itself, as Evans noted that global division of labor and inclusion into 
international trade can stimulate economic growth, and provide welfare portfolio for 
developing countries as well. 
The post-cold war period coupled with the economic boom in South East Asian 
regained the credibility of the westernized version of modernization theory. Yet, 
Inglehart and others noted for the need to revisit the classical version of it to match the 
new global developments, for example Inglehart believes that Russia and China are likely 
to democratize because of the long-term effects of socioeconomic growth on individuals‟ 
behaviors, thus the institutional manifestation of such values will take place.
93
 He 
advocated for the internal fallacies within the main stream underpinnings of 
modernization in terms of the perquisites that assume certain level of “modern” values 
for a given society to progress.
94
 On the other hand, he did not adopt the neo-Marxist 
stances that owed the underdevelopment of the poor countries to the exploitation by the 
rich capitalist north.  
The process of industrialization leads to cultural shifts, yet this change is path 
dependent, i.e. not uniform.
95
 Cultural zones primarily designed by Samuel Huntington, 
and later on used by Inglehart prove to have a stabilizing effect on the worldwide post-
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 Guillermo O‟Donnell, Op. Cit. 
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 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, “How Development Leads to Democracy: What We Know About 
Modernization,” Foreign Affairs, March/April Issue, 2009, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64821/ronald-inglehart-and-christian-welzel/how-development-
leads-to-democracy, Retrived October 28, 2014.  
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materialist value change. Thus, Inglehart doubts the modernization forces‟ capability of 
producing a global culture in the near future. Second, the growing trend of anti-
secularism is overlooked. Theoretically, processes of industrialization and post- 
industrialization yields less emphasis on the traditional religious values, yet a growing 
interest in the meaning and purpose of life provides a counterbalanced effects. Third, the 
path dependency of value change is present within each cultural zone itself, not only 
cross-cultural. Finally, the mode and magnitude of value change is dependent on various 
factors, yet the distinction between long/short term value changes is highly important. 
Long-term value changes are likely to occur, with no necessary westernized 
“Americanization” turnover in world values. Thus, unlike the first phase of 
modernization theory, the post-industrial version of modernization increases the demand 
for democracy and little government interference with remarkable human autonomy.  
The Postmaterialism Thesis 
By late 1970s, Inglehart developed a technique to understand the value changing 
trends all over the world. He did not fell into the trap of unicultural attributes, and to 
overcome the hardships connected with the usage of culture as residual variable, he rather 
focused on long-term effects of socioeconomic development, which is fairly stable to 
overcome the legitimate criticism of the fluctuation and fragmentation of the culturist 
approaches.
96
 It started with his silent revolution thesis, observing a value change towards 
post-materialism analyzing the Euro barometer, then he considered more as a cultural 
shift by the end of the cold war, and by early 2000s, he started to revisit his original thesis 
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by accounting for the short-term effects of inflation and its temporal effects on long-term 
post-material value standings.
97
  
In theory, the central claim of modernization is that economic prosperity leads to 
change in worldwide values in a predictable mode.
98
 The heavy reliance on 
industrialization is to yield occupational specialization, high levels of education, rising 
economic growth. These effects change the existential living conditions of individuals in 
any given society. Modernization is a budding course of human development forced by 
socioeconomic progression; it brings cultural change in terms of gender roles, authority 
perceptions, sexual norms, religious beliefs, and more participation in the polity‟s affairs. 
It likely yields a new form of society that is more emancipative than earlier forms of 
societal progression.
99
 Such changes according to Inglehart are not under any control, 
thus elites or military leaders might think of limiting its effects, yet it is more profound 
and hard to be restricted.  
On the other hand, post-materialism is linked to the changing nature of work and 
economy into post-industrial developments. Daniel Bell noted that the changes in nature 
of economic transactions in the postwar epoch, where a shift towards service products 
take over businesses all over the world.
100
 Such shift has major political, economic and 
social consequences. The more secure existential living conditions drives human value to 
focus on quality of life, environmentalism and self-expression, or in another words what 
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Inglehart regarded as postmaterialist values.  The pre-industrial life is dominated by 
conflict against nature, thus more emphasis on traditional-religious values. Furthermore 
with complexities in economic transactions, humans manipulated their nature. This gave 
the rise of material ideologies that focuses on secular-rational interpretations of history. 
The shift towards post-industrial mode of production gave the rise of more autonomous 
explanations of history, where more and more people lives in mechanic societies, thus it 
becomes a game against persons.
101
   
Findings of the WVS enhance the hypothesis on the Human Development 
Sequence as shown in figure 2.1 based on the rise of post-materialism in postwar 
developed societies. The core theme of broadening human choices by elevating social, 
material and cognitive constraints on human calculations results a socioeconomic change, 
rising values towards of self-expression, and growing trend of democratization. The 
socioeconomic modernization process decreases objective capabilities on humans that 
escalates people‟s autonomous choices. Changing global values gives more emphasis on 
individual liberty, allows for human diversity, in other words “self-expression” values. 
This syndrome of values focuses on civil and political liberties which comprises 
democracy. It allows people the flexibility to be more autonomous, thus realizing 
freedom of speech and action. The rise of self-expression in short qualifies modernization 
to be an emancipative process of human development. 
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Figure 2.1 Process of Human Development 
 
Source: Christian Welzel, Focal Point Human Development: On the Foundations 
of Democracy and the Causes of its Spread (German), Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002, p. 
46.  
 
World Cultural Map in the New Millennium  
Inglehart based on a conviction of the changing nature of world values towards 
postmaterialism has set different mechanisms to test his proposed thesis. The centrality of 
rising self-expression values in post-industrial societies provides an adequate indicator to 
see such related effects. As in such societies; services and knowledge-based businesses 
are prevailing, workers deal with binary codes, symbols and ideas; thus more freedom to 
take decisions and open up for new ideas. Moreover, the social safety net that surrounds 
new life conditions changes the existential threats that face the post-industrial individuals 
resulting in upgrading their human development syndrome as proposed by Inglehart. On 
the other hand and despite of globalization, the realization of self-expression and secular 
values is not yet homogenous around the world. In many parts of the world due to 
economic stagnation, individuals do not prioritize such post-materialist values.
102
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In this section, I use Inglehart‟s technique to trace the changes of world values 
related to the rise of post-materialism in the world at the turn of the new millennium to 
assess the global trend of such values, and then I classify it geographically rather than 
Inglehart‟s classification that rests on Huntington‟s cross-cultural clash units.  
Subsequent to the fall of the Berlin Wall; Samuel Huntington, Robert Putnam and others 
noted the persistence of cultural traditions over the simplistic conviction of homogenous 
international culture.
103
 Huntington classified the world into major cultural zones that 
includes; western-Christians, Orthodox part, Islamic world, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, 
African and Latin American Zones. In this part I developed the same dimensions used by 
Inglehart to assess the shift in post-industrial societies to place different parts of the world 
in this cross-cultural variation values comparison. 
I used data from the 6
th
 wave of the WVS conducted between 2010 and 2014 to 
compare it to Inglehart‟s earlier work on the same dimensions. I use PCA method to 
extract two dimensions reflecting “traditional versus secular-rational” values on the one 
hand, while the other indicates “survival versus self-expression” on the national level.104    
Table 2.1 presents the factor loadings of these ten items and the description of the two-
extracted dimensions. 
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Table 2.1 Dimensions of Cross-Cultural Variation: National-Level 
 Factor 
Loadings 
Traditional values emphasize the following 
(Secular-rational values emphasize the opposite)
106
 
 
God is very important for respondent .484 
It is more important for children to learn obedience and religious faith 
than independence and determination (Autonomy Index) 
.337 
Abortion is never justified .324 
Respondent has a strong national pride .683 
Respondent favors more respect for authority  .504 
Survival values emphasize the following 
(Self-expression values emphasize the opposite)
107
 
 
 
Respondent gives priority to economic and physical security over self-
expression and quality of life (4-item postmaterialist index) 
.495 
Respondent feels not very happy .326 
Homosexuality is never justified .745 
Respondent did not and would not sign a petition  .539 
Respondent is careful about trusting other people  .359 
Note: World Values Survey, Wave 6 (2010-2014) 
As table 2.1 shows, the two extracted factors loaded quiet lower in my extracted 
PCA components than Inglehart‟s earlier works of 1997 and 2005, as it loaded above 
(0.6) in his earlier work. I owe such results to the effect of missing data that is estimated 
to be about 12%; where the statistical application used here Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS) excludes countries that contain missing items. 
108
 The extracted factors 
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correlated at r=0.514. The logic behind selecting these ten items –same as Inglehart- is 
the consistency of these questions across the WVS. 
In order to produce a world cultural map at 2014 that assesses postmaterialist 
value rankings around the world according to the earlier extracted factors, I then 
extracted the arithmetic mean scores of countries of the WVS sixth wave, and then place 
them graphically. For the sake of such analysis, country cases were weighted around 
1500 observations per nation. And due to the effect of missing data, only 50 countries 
produced means, thus 16.4% of the data were excluded due to pairwise exclusion 
technique, leaving the final cases to be (N=65183). Missing values as mentioned above 
affects the number of eligible countries, as it was excluded automatically on the factor 
loading analysis.
109
  
Results of the countries‟ mean score values of over the two extracted dimensions; 
emphasizes the same pattern discussed in Inglehart‟s work of 1997 and 2005; where 
higher scores on the two dimensions is found among developed high-income countries.
110
 
In accordance with the world development indicators of 2015, the countries of high 
economic status scored the highest on the estimated means of the post-materialism 
dimensions.
111
 Figure 2.2 represents the countries‟ mean scores on two axes; the 
horizontal one indicates progression towards “Self-Expression” values, while the vertical 
axis tends towards “Secular-Rational” values. Both progressive values tend towards the 
positive pole.  
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The following figure is represented in geographical terms rather than Inglehart‟s 
earlier reliance on Huntington‟s cultural zones. The logic behind such classification is 
that I believe that the cultural-zones classification is subjective, geographical zones is 
more valid. Moreover it shows that Middle East is scoring lowest on both dimensions, in 
another words, one can grasp that peoples of such region face direct economic hardship 
particularly in the past four years following the political instability in this part of the 
world resulting in the focus on survival values, with reliance on traditional values expect 
for deviant cases such as Lebanon. On the other hand, Western Europe and North 
America scores are the highest on both dimensions. It reflects a higher level of existential 
security and social safety net, thus more emphasis on rationality and self-expression 
values are reported. Other parts of the world scores differently and in turn placed over 
diverse parts on the graph. South East Asia countries scores just below North America, 
which means that this part of the world is rapidly changing its value identification as 
result of the mid-1990s economic prosperity. The figure in general matches our original 
assumption that the high degree of modernity in terms of value expression is related to 
socioeconomic progression.  
To sum up, the growing trend of postmaterialism at the turn of the new 
millennium is still prevalent; however the magnitude of such progression is different 
from one part of the world to another. While scores are really high in Western Europe 
and North America, the Middle East region is still scoring negatively on both dimensions. 
This growing trend which results in changing gender, political, and individualistic values 
can be contested in developing states as latter sections will show. Scores on Inglehart‟s 
53 
 
survival/self-expression and traditional/secular-rational dimensions show variations in 
cultural homogeny of post-materialist values that he predicted before.  
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Figure 2.2 Mean of Country Scours on Cross-Cultural Value Variations (World Map) 
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Value Change in the Middle East 
In this study‟s quest to place Egyptian values within a wider global and regional 
context. I believe it‟s of a great importance to compare Egyptian value system to other 
states in MENA given the commonalties among these states in terms of culture, economy 
and the nature of respective political regimes.  
Figure 2.3 represents the location of MENA countries on Inglehart‟s dimensions 
from 2000 till 2014.
112
 Vertical axis represents variation from traditional to secular-
rational values towards the positive pole, while horizontal axis represents variation from 
survival to self-expression values. The reason for the incomprehensive representation in 
the below figure, i.e. missing countries, is due to large number of missing cases in wave 6 
(2010-2014); thus, much of the respective country scores cannot be obtained. In addition, 
questions did change from wave to another, yet I tried to stick to Inglehart-Welzel 
original items in the 1997 and 2005 dimensions for comparison reasons. The figure 
shows Egypt‟s value system changing from 2001 to 2008 on the self-expression 
continuum, and slightly towards secular-rational values. A plausible explanation for that 
is the growing disconnect with government‟s economic and social policies during the 
Ahmed Nazif second‟s cabinet with remarkable increase in the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth rates explained earlier. Thus, an obvious movement on the horizontal axis 
is noted, while degrees of conservatism are still maintain.  However, it is important to 
bear in mind that Egypt‟s scores lies in the (negative) area on the aggregate dimensions.  
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Figure 2.3 Mean of MENA Country Scores on Inglehart‟s Model (2000-2014) 
 
Note: 4=2000-2004, 5=2005-2008 and 6=2010-2014 
Source: World Values Survey Waves 4, 5 and 6 (2000-2014) 
 
In fact most of the countries in the region scores negatively on both dimensions 
expect for both Lebanon (2010-2014) and Israel (2000-2004). While both Iraq and 
Tunisia changed their scores to be positive on the secular-rational dimension in (2010-
2014), yet they still negatively scores on the self-expression dimension. An important 
remark as well, is that Qatar (2010-2014) and Saudi Arabia (2000-2004) scores the 
highest among other Arab states on the self-expression dimension. I argue that it does not 
necessarily mean a shift towards postmaterialist values, however it reflects a high level of 
existential security related to the oil-revenues that such states acquire.
113
 Arab spring 
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states, such as Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt scores higher than other states on the 
secular-traditional dimension, with less development on the self-expression axis. Hence, 
the above figure can lead us to assume that there is a limited movement towards more 
expression values in the Middle East.  
2.2 Value System(s) in Egypt 
By early 2000s, Egypt has been through considerable change in its political, 
economic and social spheres. This wave of transformation had its impact on the Egyptian 
society. Although many highlighted the post-millennial transformations in Egypt, yet 
little work accounted for the changing nature of changing values of the Egyptian society. 
In the section below, I start by highlighting the sociopolitical background of Egypt in the 
post 2000 epoch, then I account for the aggregate/disaggregate value change in Egypt 
based on Inglehart‟s Postmaterialism indices. Other than filling the knowledge gap on the 
structure of Egyptian value system, this section further aims at providing an overview on 
the current settings of Egyptian value systems.  
Socioeconomic and Political Background   
Since 1978 peace agreement with Israel and the adoption of the Infitah “Open-
Economy” during Sadat‟s reign (1970-1981), the Egyptian society has transformed 
dramatically given its earlier socialist attachments prioritized by President Gamal Abdel-
Nasser (1954-1970).
114
 Mubarak –coming from the same institutional background and 
formerly served as Sadat‟s deputy- as mentioned earlier continued in his predecessor‟s 
economic strategies. The composition of successive governments under Mubarak reveals 
such fact as well. Table 2.2 shows list of cabinets under Mubarak in which most of the 
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head of these governments were technocrats or university professors affiliated with the 
NDP adopted neo-liberal economic policies. Successive governments in Egypt aimed at 
coping with the International Monetary Fund‟s (IMF) structural adjustments accords and 
the regime willingness at that time to integrate Egypt‟s economy into world trade and 
alleviate the external debt.  
Table 2.2 List of Cabinets under Mubarak since 1986 
Prime Minster Government Term Political Affiliation 
Atef Sedky 1986-1996 NDP 
Kamal Elganzouri 1996-1999 NDP 
Atef Ebeid 1999-2004 NDP 
Ahmed Nazif 2004-2011 NDP 
Source: Former Prime Ministers of Egypt, Egyptian Cabinet, 
http://www.cabinet.gov.eg/Cabinet/Former.aspx, Retrived May 2, 2015.  
 
In order for the Mubarak regime to face the chronic external debt that Egypt 
suffered from since the 1960s. Successive governments since the 1990s took harsh 
macro-economic measures mainly in the form of cutting public spending and 
privatization. However, the Egyptian economy entered a stagnation period by the end of 
the 1990s due to political instability and lack of investments. Thus, since 2004; Nazif‟s 
cabinet had to rethink its Macroeconomic strategy, as to focus on deregulation in terms of 
trade regulations, tax system and investment portfolio to attract private and foreign 
investments.
115
 Coupled with the rise of Gamal Mubarak and his direct/ indirect 
involvement in both NDP and Nazif‟s cabinet economic planning, Egypt GDP growth 
rate reached 7.2% in 2008 representing the highest value in 25 years.
116
 Moreover, World 
Bank considered the Egyptian economy as one of the most developing economies in mid-
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2000. See Figure 2.4 below on Egypt‟s GDP annual growth rates (1999-2011), that shows 
periods of economic growth and stagnation during the past decade. 
Figure 2.4 GDP Growth Rate in Egypt (1999-2011) 
 
Source: CIA World Fact book and World Development Indicators 
 
However, the international recognition of the high GDP growth rates did not 
reflect in internal political stability or satisfaction with income redistribution given the 
earlier waves of privatization and social inequality shared by many sectors in the 
Egyptian society especially the workers. Table 2.3 shows the number of worker strikes 
from 1999 till 2008, it shows an increase especially during the high economic growth 
periods of 2007 and 2008 especially in the private sector. This raises the question of 
whether the periods of economic growth in Egypt reflects nominal or real economic 
growth and whether it resulted in just income distribution and higher livings standards.  
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Table 2.3 Number of Workers‟ Strikes per Sector (1999-2008) 
Year Government 
Sector 
Public Business 
Sector 
Private Sector Total 
1999 13 10 15 54 
2001 3 6 9 40 
2002 6 8 5 19 
2002 8 3 13 24 
2003 6 3 16 25 
2004 24 10 9 43 
2005 21 13 12 46 
2006 17 13 17 47 
2007 36 31 43 110 
2008 37 17 68 112 
Source: The Struggle for Worker Rights in Egypt, Solidarity Center, 2010, pp. 16-17, 
www.solidaritycenter.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2015%2F02%2Fpubs_egypt_wr1.pdf, 
Retrived May 2, 2015. 
 
Politically, the first decade of 2000s was remarkably salient in addition to several 
economic developments. In February 2005, Mubarak announced his intention to amend 
article 76 of the 1971 constitution which defines the procedures for choosing the 
president.
117
 It allowed for the first time for a direct people‟s vote in selecting the 
president. Then in 2007 a set of amendments was passed on the same article that 
solidifies the ruling NDP‟s role in selecting the future president of Egypt. 118 
These amendments coupled with the visibility of Mubarak Junior, intensified the 
narratives on the possible line of succession of power in Egypt, i.e. within Mubarak‟s 
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family. It was then termed as Altawrith “Inheritance” project.119 Such development gave 
a momentum for the rise of social movements to erupt given the restricted nature of the 
political regime at that time, Kefaya “Enough” movement -aimed at failing the earlier 
mentioned succession project- took the lead in paving the way for various  routes of 
untamed opposition to appear. Youth movements were formulated from Kefaya and other 
protest organizations such as April 6
th
. These kinds of activities as argued in earlier 
sections used secured cyber space to organize and recruit their supporters. 
Waves of post-2000 political activism according to Dina Shehata can be identified 
in four phases.
120
 The first phase is closely related to external affairs such as the 
Palestinian Intifada in 2000 and the war on Iraq 2003, which was manifested in the 
March 20
th
 movement that brought thousands of Egyptians into Tahrir square. The 
second phase focused on democratization, with the installation of "Kefaya" movement 
that adopted unconciliatory notions with the regime, which attracted cross-ideological 
youth. The third phase is closely associated with the socioeconomic grievances mainly 
manifested in workers' demands, as youth comprehended that grass-rooted social work 
might be the mean for change. Finally, the fourth phase is a return to the political sphere 
with the timing of succession in the regime from Mubarak to his son. 
The earlier mentioned economic and political developments had major 
sociopolitical consequences on the Egyptian society in terms of social grievances, 
inequality and the rise of new-capitalist elites that took over the formal political sphere.  
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Postmaterialism in Egypt 
Based on the qualitative assessments presented in earlier sections that indicate the 
changing socioeconomic and political milieu of Egyptian and the political socialization of 
Egyptian youth, we believe there are enough reasons to assume that Egyptian values are 
undergoing process of change as a reflection of existential progression. In this section; I 
use Inglehart “Materialism/Postmaterialism” 4-item and 12-item batteries to trace such 
value change through the WVS waves of 4, 5 and 6. These indices reflect progression 
towards postmaterialism at the positive end. Moreover, for more robustness, Egypt‟s data 
were extracted and weighted according to several parameters provided by the 
CAPMAS.
121
 The Materialism/Postmaterialism 4-item index is composed repeated 
questions used  in successive WVS waves that are classified on the earlier dimensions.
122
 
Question items follow the subsequent order: 
1. Maintaining order in the nation; 
2. Giving the people more say in important government decisions; 
3. Fighting rising prices; 
4. Protecting freedom of speech;  
With these earlier responses, 6 combinations can be reached. Options (2 and 4) 
yield postmaterialist values, while items (1 and 3) compose materialist values. The other 
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remaining 4 combinations produce mixed-values yielding an additive scale ranging 
between -2 and +2, where the latter indicates postmaterialist values.  
Projecting such index on the Egyptian case with data available from the WVS; 
Table 2.4 represents the distribution of “postmaterialist/materialist” percentages among 
the three waves on Egypt. The table clearly reflects a decreasing emphasis on the 
postmaterialist values after 2001. In theory, an increasing prioritization of one type of 
values is directly linked to a decrease in another set of value type. Where only 0.9% of 
Egyptians at 2012 were considered to hold such progressive values, coupled with 
growing emphasis on pure materialist values. Such result contradicts the high level of 
economic growth reported in the second half of the first decade of the 21
st
 century in 
Egypt. In the same line, I constructed a Percentage Difference Index (PDI)
 123
 scores to 
detect aggregate value shifts in Egypt. In the same table, PDI scores are increasing as 
well, in particular between 2008 and 2012 to reach -62.4%. Inglehart accounted for short-
term fluctuations in the level of postmaterialist values in given societies as an effect of 
inflation. However, I urge with such obvious difference, post-2011 with the political and 
economic instability, it led for more emphasis on pure materialist values focusing on 
basic needs, thus less attention is assigned to emancipative values.  
Table 2.4 Percentages of Postmaterialist/Materialist 4-item Index in Egypt (2001-2012) 
Year Postmaterialist 
% 
Mixed 
% 
Materialist  
% 
(N) PDI 
Score 
Index 
2001 5.3 48.7 46.1 2461 -40.8 
2008 1.7 53.4 44.9 2523 -43.2 
2012 0.9 35.8 63.3 2525 -62.4 
Source: WVS waves 4, 5 and 6 (2001-2008-2012) 
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For more visual representation, figure 2.5 shows the same postmaterialist/ 
materialist 4-item index distribution of the decreasing emphasis of post-materialist effects 
in the Egyptian society in bars from 2001 to 2012.  
Figure 2.5 Postmaterialist/ Materialist 4-item Index Percentages by Wave in Egypt 
 
Source: WVS waves 4, 5, and 6 (2001-2008-2012) 
 
The other index used by Inglehart throughout his thesis is the 12-item value 
index.
124
 This index thought to be more reliable and valid as it shows a wide range of 
variability among respondents to account for the short-term inflation effects.
125
 In 
addition to the four-item battery; this index includes other two sets of questions adding up 
to 12-items as the following:  
1. Maintaining a high rate of economic growth; 
2. Making sure that this country has strong defense forces; 
3. Seeing that people have more say in how things are decided at work and in their 
communities; 
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4. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.  
In this set, options (1 and 2) designed as materialist values, while options (3 and 
4) yield postmaterialist values.  The other set of this index includes: 
1. Maintain stable economy; 
2. Progress towards a less impersonal, more humane society; 
3. Fight against crime; 
4. Progress toward a society where ideas are more important than money.  
Options (1 and 3) in this set designed to reflect materialist values as well, while 
options (2 and 4) yields postmaterialist values. The scores from respective categories on 
postmaterialist/materialism are summed up yielding an additive scale from 0 to +5, where 
the positive pole reflects postmaterialist values. Table 2.5 shows that the mean values on 
the 12-item index in Egypt by wave at three different points of time; 2001, 2008 and 
2012. Bearing in mind that a perfect postmaterialist score by individual is achieving score 
of (+5), scores at its highest during the early 2000s was 1.68 on average. Moreover, 
results show a growing emphasis as well on pure materialist expressions that emphasize 
traditional-cultural attachments coupled with the importance of present-day challenges in 
terms of economic hardships.  
Table 2.5 Mean Scores on Postmaterialist/Materialist 12-Item Index by Wave in Egypt 
Year Mean Score (N) 
2001 1.62 2440 
2008 1.42 2514 
2012 1.08 2525 
Source: WVS Waves 4, 5 and 6 (2001-2008-2012) 
In conclusion, overall scores on both 4-item and 12-item postmaterialism batteries 
in Egypt show an inverse trend towards materialist values different from the international 
trends portrayed in the earlier sections. Although countries in the region scores negatively 
on Inglehart‟s cultural map, however I argue that postmaterialism status in Egypt is lower 
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than respective Arab states since its turbulent economy dating back to the 1960s. 
Moreover, such conclusion is emphasized in the post-2011 epoch due to political 
instability and the obvious social grievances expressed by individuals mainly through 
sectoral demands. Many scholars and commentators in Egypt argued that sectoral 
demands is the real driving force behind the 2011 uprising not liberal progressive 
aspirations. Such assumption can be packed by the general scores presented above. 
2.3 Youth and Postmaterialism in Egypt   
 In this section I focus exclusively on youth postmaterialist values in Egypt before 
and after the 2011 uprising. As it was believed, the 2011 events aimed at achieving 
democracy and political freedoms, thus it can be placed under the category of 
postmaterialist “self-expression” values. I control for the age category between (16-30) as 
the weight provided through CPAMAS demographics, then I test two general claims, one 
is related to effect of age and other is income on postmaterialist values among Egyptian 
youth. However, it is worthy to note that overall scores of such values are low in Egypt in 
general. Moreover, questions used by Inglehart are not sensitive for developing 
communities. For instance, question such as “having more say in government decisions,” 
can be regarded as materialist in Egypt in contrast to its classification as postmaterialist 
indicator at other understandings in other parts of the world.  
Effect of Age in Comparative Context  
Much of the literature on long-term patterns of postmaterialist values in western 
societies is contingent upon generational replacement. Generational replacements due life 
socialization effects are central for Inglehart‟s thesis. Younger generations (cohorts) 
replace older ones through an accumulative process of graduation resulting in change in 
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political and social attitudes and behaviors of the publics. In this section, I aim to portray 
the structure of youth value system in Egypt on both postmaterialist 12-item and 4-item 
indices developed by Inglehart. Then, compare it to similar patterns among other young 
generations all over the world to assess the plausibility of Inglehart‟s model in explaining 
youth value change in Egypt.  
I use both 12-item and 4-item postmaterialist indices for more comprehensive 
results. They are constructed respectively on scales from (0 to +5) and (-2 to +2) that 
possibly sensitive for short-term inflation fluctuations as well. Here, I test my first claim 
that there younger generations in Egypt are more likely to hold postmaterialist values in 
forms of desire to have more say in politics and active participation in their respective 
communities. Since their formative socialization experiences took place during periods of 
economic prosperity in comparison to older cohorts.  
Hypothesis 1: younger generations are more likely to express postmaterialist 
values in comparison to their older peers in Egypt 
First, Table 2.6 tests the relationship between postmaterialist values and age in 
Egypt through successive waves. Age as continuous variable tends to be highest on its 
positive pole, and materialist/postmaterialist indices are positively arranged as explained 
before.  Cases were weighted based on earlier data –mentioned above- from the 2006 
CAPMAS census in Egypt. The results show the same pattern of decreasing emphasis on 
postmaterialism among all Egyptian from 2001 to 2008. However, postmaterialist values 
increases when age decrease, which matches our original assumption as well as 
Inglehart‟s thesis on generational change. Still the magnitude of such association is 
relatively low across all waves in Egypt. Association between age and postmaterialism is 
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at its maximum in 2001, Pearson coefficient scored r= -0.153 in the 4-item battery and r= 
-0.145 in the 12-item battery at 99% confidence level. And trends continue to decline in 
subsequent waves as well.  
Table 2.6 Correlation between Materialist/Postmaterialist indices and Age 
Survey Year Pearson Coefficient  
Age 4-Item Index 12-Item Index 
2001 -0.153** -0.145** 
2008 -0.026* -0.049* 
2012 -0.039 -0.017 
                               * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
                               Source: WVS 4, 5, and 6 (2001-2008-2012) 
 
Figure 2.6 show the mean scores of age categories on the 
Materialist/Postmaterialist 12-item dimension in Egypt is declining since 2001 through 
2012. Arithmetic mean scores of the younger cohort (16-30) scores highest on the 
continuum among the three different waves. Such result further emphasizes the earlier 
correlation between age and the proposed dimensions. However, the trend in the table 
matches the original trend on decreasing emphasis on postmaterialist values especially 
after the 2011 events. Although younger cohort (16-30) scores highest on the continuum, 
which explains their differential values in relation to other cohorts, still the decreasing 
emphasis on postmaterialism leaves our quest unsolved. It can be owed to short-term 
inflation effects mainly that marked the post-2011 epoch. As mentioned above sectoral 
demands were at its highest following the uprising. Moreover, since Egypt increased its 
internal and external debts following the uprising, it was reflected in decreasing quality 
levels of public services, thus many of Egyptians including the youth see direct economic 
conditions crucial for life conditions. 
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Figure 2.6 Materialist/Postmaterialist 12-item means scores by Age Categories 
 
Source: WVS,4, 5and 6  (2001, 2008 and 2012) 
 
Another simple method is to compare Egyptian youth mean value scores on the 
used index to the international means. In 2001, world youth (16-30) mean score value 
was 1.93, while Egyptian youth scored 1.8; that indicates that Egyptian youth at the turn 
of the millennium was of more open to participate more in the political process and 
rethink traditional norms on average level according to the international standards. In 
2008, Egyptian youth value mean score was 1.46, while international mean was 1.55. 
Thus, still Egyptian youth was near to the average international scores. However, in 2012, 
the international mean score was 2.03, whereas Egyptian youth score was 1.08. That 
indicates a drastic decrease on the emphasis on postmaterialist values of self-expression 
and secularism on the contrary to what was expected in the aftermath of the 2011 events 
and related political mobilization. I argue this finding is very important to explain the de-
politicization and polarization that Egypt is facing in the aftermath of the uprising after 
the overestimation of youth abilities at that time. Additionally, it opens the door for 
casting doubt about the youth abilities claim. 
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To further test the relationship between age and postmaterialism is to compare 
Egyptian youth in its regional and international contexts, thus to be able to answer the 
original hypothesis if international youth value trends hold for Egypt or not. I developed 
mean scores for countries on the 12-item index for the (16-30) age category based on the 
6
th
 wave of WVS (2010-2014).
126
 Cases were weighted around 1500 to normalize the 
results. Cross-national mean scores‟ results were very informative. Bearing in mind that 
the international average score on this index is 2.03, results shows that Egyptian youth 
values mean score is between the lowest among the 50 countries used in this 
measurement. While it scored 1.08 in Egypt, western European countries scored the 
highest, for instance Sweden scored 2.81, and 2.14 was the U.S score. Even Arab states 
expect for Tunisia and Yemen, scored more than Egypt. Lebanese youth for instance got 
2.08, even Libya, Morocco and Iraq scored between (1.77 and 1.68). 
Income Effect  
In this final section, I test Inglehart‟s main causal mechanism related to the 
generational shift towards postmaterialist values, which is the effect of income. As level 
of income increases, existential constraints on human minds decreases resulting in 
changing values related to gender, sexuality and more deliberative democratic practices. 
Thus, my main hypothesis in this section: 
Hypothesis 1: higher income levels among young Egyptians, is likely to result in 
higher levels of postmaterialist value preferences  
I use data from the WVS on waves 4 and 5 that were conducted in Egypt at 2001 
and 2008 respectively to construct an OLS regression model only for youth (16-30). 
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Cases were weighted according the 2006 CAPMAS demographic outputs as mentioned 
before. Data from 6
th
 WVS wave at 2012 in Egypt were excluded as income and place of 
residency variables were not reported by the collecting agency. Dependent variable is the 
12-item materialist/postmaterialist index that tends to positive pole, while the main 
independent variable is a scaled-income that was reported in local currency from less than 
500 Egyptian pounds to more than 12501 pounds per month. Thus, we expect to find 
positive correlation between both variables. I use other controls that were reported in 
binary forms, education refers to college degree holders, gender refers to females, while 
place of residency refers to urban residents.
127
  
Results from table 2.7 on the factors affecting postmaterialism among Egyptian 
youth between 2001 and 2008; shows that income is of great explanatory power on our 
postmaterialist parameter in 2008, as it explains 0.37 increase in such values if income 
increases at 90% confidence level, while at 2001 it was statistically insignificant, this has 
to with the high level of economic growth reported between 2005 and 2008, thus those 
who has more income are likely to be postmaterialist. In a related vein, high education 
level is robust across models, explaining 0.425 in 2001 and 0.417 in 2008 the increase in 
such values at 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively, only males are more 
supportive of such values in 2001 which I think has to do with the higher level of social 
security among males at the turn of the millennium in comparison to females.  
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Table 2.7 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Postmaterialism among Youth in Egypt  
 2001 
Model 1 
2008 
Model 1 
Income -0.008 
(0.017) 
0.37 * 
(0.017) 
College Degree 0.425** 
(0.152) 
0.417*** 
(0.115) 
Gender (=female) -0.209** 
(0.075) 
0.091 
(0.069) 
Urban -0.007 
(0.074) 
-0.017 
(0.083) 
Intercept 1.905*** 
(0.101) 
1.221*** 
(0.085) 
R2 0.017 0.026 
N 912 900 
Note: standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01  
Source: WVS (2001 and 2008) on Egypt 
 
Ultimately, I conclude the following remarks on the postmaterialist 
intergenerational value change thesis. First, Inglehart scholarship on growing 
accumulative long-term trend of postmaterialist value change was primarily designed and 
tested in the western developed hemisphere of the world. Although he revisited many of 
the universal conceptions of modernization, yet it cannot be argued that it holds 
comprehensively for other parts of the world as shown in earlier discussion. Hence, we 
call for refining the index while accepting its principal causal mechanism.  
Second, mean scores for Egyptian youth values and other MENA-states are below 
the international average mean on the materialist/postmaterialist indices. Further this 
trend is back-warding internationally and clearly in Egypt due to different factors. 
Internationally, one can assume that the 2008 financial crisis caused much of this 
decreasing emphasis on postmaterialist values. However the overall international score on 
postmaterialist values are far from the scores of Egyptian youth in post-2011 on the 
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contrary to what have been theorized by many Middle East scholars of democracy. This 
finding is crucial to account that international postmaterialist patterns do not hold for 
Egyptian youth in the post-2011, in fact Egypt‟s scores have been decreasing steadily 
since 2001. Therefore, I can say that structure of Egyptian youth values is different from 
other international youths. It still emphasizes more on materialist priorities of survival, 
existential security and traditional-cultural dominance according to Inglehart‟s measures.  
Third, overall scores of MENA-Muslim countries are quiet low on both the 
traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression dimensions. This raises issues of 
cultural singularity and persistence of cultural traditions in this underdeveloped part of 
the world. While scores of Western Europe, North America and South East Asia are 
relatively high, this further emphasizes my original criticism on the inadequacy of such 
dimensions to be tested in MENA and Africa per se. Finally, both Inglehart‟s models 
(bivariate dimension and postmaterialist indices) are not sensitive for testing Egyptian 
youth value system. It can be owed to its Eurocentric routes, question wording, data 
collection techniques and might be due to the unfulfilled prophecy of modernization per 
se. The results above entails more investigation for the material values among Egyptian 
youth that was statistically shown to be different from older generations, yet have not 
been empirically considered before these lines are being written. 
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CHAPTER III 
YOUHT POLITICAL AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES  
The widespread popular mobilization took place in Egypt during 2011 had 
remarkable implications on the study of youth participation and role in the society.
128
 
Moreover, it instigates problematizing this demographic phenomenon going beyond the 
age as independent factor in explaining such unpredicted wave of activism. Younger age 
cohorts -termed as political generation in much of this study-, who participated and in 
part prepared for this unprecedented historic wave of mobilization, gauge much of the 
potential of democratization in Egypt. Many scholars and commentators argued that they 
differ in their features from older generations, thus affecting the direction of change in the 
country‟s political settings.  
This chapter deals with such claim on Egypt‟s current political generations; from 
an individual-oriented perspective. As earlier chapter showed that Egypt‟s young 
generation differs from international trends of postmaterialism, I aim in this chapter to 
portray and anatomize youth value holdings. Moreover, I account for the fragmentation 
effects with the current generation of young Egyptians, in another words, I do not treat 
the youth as holistic one bloc. I start by examining youth political values using different 
parameters such as interest in politics, political trust and efficacy to gauge the differences 
among Egyptian cohorts testing the claim on youth‟s singularity and its relation to 
mobilizing the 2011 uprising. Then, I examine their democratic values in terms of 
support, authoritarian attitudes and degree of satisfaction with political system based on 
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democratic literature that accounts for youth activism and their related role in successful 
democratization. This chapter provides an unconventional understanding for the profiles 
of young Egyptians that are believed to be diverse unlike the original assumptions by 
many Middle East scholars.  
3.1 Youth Political Values 
The study of political generations in the Arab world since the 1970s regarded the 
youth category to determine future pathways of respective Arab states. Tessler noted that 
before on his studies on Algerian and Moroccan youth in early 2000s, in which they 
differ from their older counterparts whose formative years were deeply entrenched with 
the independence struggle in contrast to the post- independence periods of 1970s and the 
1980s.
129
 Those who were brought up after1970s in the Arab world are thought to be 
more expressionists and democratic in different way from their peers as well.
130
  
I hold similar argument in Egypt, given the historic mobilization took place in 
2011 and its implications on the Egyptian political system. However, I believe that post-
2011 settings showed lack of political organization and high fragmentation among the 
young themselves. In the following sections, we tend to explore the generational 
differences in respect to political orientations in Egypt during the 2000s. And the next 
step is to anatomize such generational-split, to measure the degree of value consistency 
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among youth. Table 3.1 shows list of political orientations‟ parameters used in 
subsequent sections based on obtainability of available data sets.  
Table 3.1 Political Values‟ Indicators 
 WVS 2000 WVS 2008 AB 2011 WVS 2012 AB 2013 
Interest in 
Politics 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
Political 
Trust 
 
 
  
X 
 
 
 
 
Political 
Efficacy 
 
 
  
X 
 
 
 
X 
X= used items 
 
Interest in Politics 
Measuring political and behavioral attitudes is a deep-rooted tradition when it 
comes to assessing youth‟s political involvement, participation, and the reasons for their 
social exclusion in the northern hemisphere of the world.
131
 Generally, youth perceived to 
be disinterested in politics and public affairs.
132
 Previous explanations owe such findings 
to the shared belief of irrelevance of politics to youngsters. Moreover, youth see no direct 
attachment for politics to their direct material interests. In addition, other studies focus on 
the complexity of the political phenomenon to young people to comprehend. Moreover, 
as part of their rebellious nature, young people showed steadily low level of confidence in 
governments and politicians. On the other hand, much of the research that challenges 
such deliberative alienated youth perceptions focuses mainly on their voluntary 
philanthropy activities.
133
 Hence and in the same line, following the 2011 events in 
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Egypt, studies on Egyptian youth involvement, accounted for the safe spaces “parallel 
spheres” that Egyptian young men and women acted in to avoid authoritarian contexts.134 
In which prior to the politicization of the Egyptian society as a post transitory effect, 
youth vocally expressed their opinions through cyber space, social media platforms, and 
organized themselves through non-profit organizations. Scholars believe that such low-
politics engagements led to the historic mobilization of January 2011. In this section, 
however we tend to discard the common perception that Egyptian youth are detached 
from public affairs, and account for the cohort differences in regards to political interest.  
Thus, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1: over the past decade, younger Egyptians are more interested in 
politics and public affairs.  
In order to test such claim, I use a common repeated item through in the  WVS 
surveys that asks respondent to show his/her degree of interest in politics on a scale from 
1 to 4.
135
 We reversed the item, thus more interest in politics tends to be at the positive 
pole. Moreover, I use data from the WVS over a period of 11 years in Egypt comparing 
generational differences and intra-generational cohort change as well. We use a bivariate 
correlation matrix between the interest in politics variable and age categories, where age 
cohorts where rounded by the CAPMAS weights mentioned above.  
For better visualization, frequency distribution was converted into percentages as 
shown in Table 3.2. It shows the levels of those who showed high or some interest in 
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politics divided by age categories. Results show that total percentages of interest in 
politics have fluctuating over the past decade in Egypt to reach its maximum after the 
2011 events reaching 69.1% of total sample in 2012. Respondents of (16-30), showed the 
lowest level of interest in politics in 2001; however their scores increased dramatically at 
2012, when they became at the age of (31-40) to score 71.7% interest in public affairs. 
Although Egyptian society has shown high level of politicization in general, and the 
differences between cohorts are not blunt, yet those who are between 16 and 30 are 
among the most politicized sections of the society with 68.2% at 2012. Life-cycle 
theories argued before that interest in public affairs is a function of age, yet the high level 
of youth politicization is remarkable and differs from other parts of the world. This 
assures our initial assumption on the politicization of Egyptian youth during 2000s and in 
the post-2011 epoch. It shows how the 2011 events politicized the whole society, 
especially among youth who are most interested in the fate of politics in their country. 
Table 3.2 Interest in Politics by Age Categories  
 2001  2008  2012 
 % 
Interested 
in Politics 
 % 
Interested 
in Politics 
 % 
Interested 
in Politics 
16-30 38.1  34.9  68.2 
31-40 39.7  27.7  71.7 
41-50 45  31.3  73.3 
51-60 42.8  60.8  66.9 
61+ 50.6  28.6  64.5 
Total 41.2%  32.7%  69.1% 
                         Source: WVS (2001-2008-2012) 
 
The high level of interest in politics in the Egyptian society signals convoluted 
messages for the sake of analysis, thus table 3.3 shows the generational value change in 
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terms of politicization, it shows that Egypt‟s younger generation in 2012 are highly 
interested in politics in relation to their older peers, while the youth of 2001 showed high 
degree of change in their interest in politics over time by (-3.2+44=40.8%) reflecting a 
higher propensity of intra-generational value change over the past decade in Egypt. One 
important lesson to be drawn here regardless of the young interest in politics; is such 
scores reflect a reaction to a certain stimuli and there is no guarantee that this will 
continue to be the case in the near future.  
Table 3.3 Change in Values of Political Interest 
     2001-2008     2008-2012 
Age Categories  
 
Value Change
136
 Value Change 
16-30 -3.2 +33.3 
31-40 -12.5 +44 
41-50 -13.7 +42 
51-60 +18 +61 
61+ -22 +35.9 
                                        Source: WVS 4, 5, and 6 (2001, 2008 and 2012) 
Political Trust  
Political trust as concept is different from trust in governing institutions; the latter 
implies an evaluating perception of the performance of ruling institutions, while the 
former entails confidence in policy outcomes. Political trust is a conviction that the 
political system –as whole or part- would return ideal outputs, even in the case of it being 
untended.
137
 This sentiment is one of the most important pillars of given regime‟s 
political stability. Political trust reflects tangible attitudes rather than mere reactions 
towards certain policies. Moreover, it provides a window for any given political system to 
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maneuver if faced different hardships with the credit of trust portrayed by its citizens. 
Following the literature on “political trust,” there are two main broad themes in explain 
such sentiments.  
One is the rational choice theory that views it from cost-benefit analysis of 
political actors‟ choices.138 Although this perspective does not deny the role of values and 
norms in shaping public‟s behavior, yet it does not regard it as sole controlling factor in 
explaining political trust. Rational choice theories focus on governmental actions and 
behavior, where the controlling independent factor is the ability of respective regimes for 
providing good policies and the public perception of officials as good or bad people.
139
  
On the other hand, cultural theories argue that short-term material calculations have little 
explanatory power in predicting the outcomes of political trust. Although the public react 
to different stimuli, however there is an interceding mechanism that ascribes meanings 
and values for it.
140
 Thus, these interceding orientations make the actors react differently 
to the same events based on number of stratifiers. On the other hand, culturalists do not 
overlook institutional effects; however changes in value and norms are independent from 
the former. Values affect people‟s behavior and have considerable explanatory power in 
predicating political trust in a given society.
141
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Projecting the earlier review on the Egyptian case; studies on political trust as part 
of democratic culture has not been thoroughly tested in the Egyptian case as part of a 
general trend of overlooking such implications in the developing world. Political trust is 
expected to be higher in authoritarian contexts as a given government presents itself as 
the state guardian, protector of peoples‟ needs and most importantly using sentiments of 
nationalism especially in the developing world.
142
 Examples of the populist regimes are 
various in the Arab world; Egypt under Nasser provides a clear example for such 
sentiments and connotations. On the other hand, studies of civic and participatory culture 
suggest some sort of political distrust, as a measure of keeping elected officials under the 
public‟s power restraining them from power abuse and corruption.143  
In this section, we argue that political trust is of importance to be tested in the 
Egyptian case reflecting generational divide. Data in hand -that reflects post-2011 
circumstances- is expected to show such divide and even more fragmentation among the 
youth themselves. Much of the research done in the developed states, show that political 
trust is a reaction towards governmental outputs rather than accumulated events. 
Moreover, we expect the young to show more political distrust than their older 
counterparts. Part of the explanation is that younger Egyptians who instigated the events 
feel that the political system let them down and insensitive for their continuous hardships, 
while the elderly who are affected by national sentiments of the post-independence 
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regimes are expected to enjoy more trust regardless of the relative failures of the 
Mubarak regime and its dissolution. This I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1: younger generation is expected to show less political trust in 
comparison to older cohorts 
Hypothesis 2: Those who receive less income are expected to show less political 
trust than those who receive more income per month in Egypt 
In doing such task, we constructed Political Trust Index (PTI) from the Arab 
Barometer data on Egypt at 2011. PTI serves as the main dependent variable in OLS 
regression showing the effect of age and income on such parameter. It is constructed 
through an additive scale ranging from -1.5 to1.5 constructed from 4 items as shown in 
figure 3.1. Items included vary from supporting government decisions unconditionally, 
government is aware of citizens‟ needs, political leaders care about public opinion, and 
that government takes citizens‟ opinions into account.144 These items correlated on 
reliability scale test at α= 0.753, where p-value< 0.01  
Figure 3.1 Political Trust Index Items of the Arab Barometer 2011 
Citizens must support the government‟s decisions even if they disagree with 
them 
 
Reversed  
Government employees are aware of citizens‟ needs 
 
Reversed 
Political leaders are concerned with the needs of ordinary citizens 
 
Reversed 
The government takes the opinions of citizens seriously 
 
Reversed  
Note: Arab Barometer Wave II 
Also I check for interaction between low income receiving individuals below 300 
pounds a month and younger generation defined as those are less than 35 years old, and I 
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expect to find highest level of political distrust among them. As for the independent 
variables, we use age and income in continuous manners, while the latter is measured in 
Egyptian pounds. Moreover, I use number of controls such as gender and place of 
residency and education level ranging from illiterate to postgraduate degree, thus in the 
models below, we insert independent variables and check for interactions while 
accounting for the various controls. 
Table 3.4 OLS Regression for Factors affecting PTI in Egypt at 2011 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Age 0.024*** 0.021***   
 (0.007) (0.006)   
Income 0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Younger Generation    0.700*** 
    (0.207) 
Young and Low Income    -0.852*** 
    (0.312) 
Education 0.027 0.037 -0.024 -0.021 
 (0.054) (0.042) (0.052) (0.053) 
Urban 0.082 0.055 0.126 0.150 
 (0.200) (0.158) (0.202) (0.198) 
Gender (=female) 0.031 0.202 0.000 0.082 
 (0.217) (0.152) (0.219) (0.219) 
Intercept  9.413*** 9.684*** 10.511*** 10.346*** 
 (0.391) (0.322) (0.217) (0.265) 
R2 0.023 0.013 0.007 0.022 
N 708 1159 708 708 
Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: AB Wave II 
 
Results from the OLS regression above in table 3.4 shows that only age accounts 
for political trust as expected, however, it is of low magnitude, where in model increase 
in PTI is a function of an increase of 0.021 years. It means as well that levels of political 
trust are low among all Egyptians in general. Other controls did not yield significant 
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correlations. As for the interaction between those of who are below 35 years old and of 
low income was statically insignificant. Thus, in this section, I can argue that overall 
level of political trust is low and age provides little evidence on its salience. However, we 
do not dismiss the effect of age in explaining low political trust.  
Political Efficacy 
Concept of political efficacy is of a major explanatory power in predicting 
political behavior and participation mechanisms. Efficacy is the feeling that socio-
political change is possible and that one can play a vital role in this evolutionary 
process.
145
 Great deal of political efficacy implies empowered citizens, in which they feel 
that they can influence outcomes and decisions of respective political systems.
146
 It is 
argued that those who are more confident in their ability to affect the political system are 
likely to support democratic system. Since the 1950s, scholars such as David Easton, has 
incorporated the concept of political efficacy into the studies of political support.
147
 
Easton and others based political efficacy during the socialization process to be the 
potential pillar for active participatory citizens in democratic systems.  
One major pillar for political efficacy is the concept of “self-efficacy” where it is 
defined as one‟s judgment of his/her competences to organize sequences of action to 
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yield certain types of enactments.
148
 Thus, self-efficacy affects one‟s choices, efforts and 
emotions related to the performance of a certain tasks. In his social cognitive theory, 
Bandura argues that self-confident citizens have the belief that they can produce certain 
effects through political actions.
149
 He also distances between collective and personal 
efficacy, where the latter or as termed “internal efficacy” might be influenced by 
adulthood experiences. Thus, early democratic experiences are expected to have ever-
lasting effects on one‟s perception of his ability to influence and change his society in 
post-adolescence periods.
150
  
In the case of Egypt‟s younger generation under study here, we aim to explore 
their political efficacy attitudes especially in the post-2011 epoch based on number of 
stratifiers. Little empirical research has been done to clarify such convoluted concept, 
whether young Egyptians are politically confident in their abilities or not. We expect to 
find younger generation more confident than their older peers especially in the post-2011, 
may be in another circumstances such assumption might be invalid. However, such 
attitudes might reflect certain reactive responses rather than profound beliefs.  
Hypothesis 1: younger Egyptians are more likely to be confident in their political 
leverage abilities  
Hence, we predict political efficacy attitudes by age to measure its correlation and 
figure out the main drivers behind such confident attitudes among young Egyptians. 
                                                           
148
 A. Bandura, “Perceived self-efficacy in cognitive development and functioning. Educational 
Psychologist,” Vol. 28, No. 2, 1993, pp. 117-148. 
 
149
 A. Bandura, Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory, Englewood Cliffs, 
Prentice-Hall, 1986, p. 483.  
 
150
 R. Niemi, S. Craig, and F. Mattei, “Measuring internal political efficacy in the 1988 national election 
study” American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, 1991, pp. 1407-1410. 
 
86 
 
Political efficacy as the main dependent variable is constructed from item in Arab 
Barometer surveys on Egypt at 2011 and 2013, which indicates that politics is too 
complicated for understanding.
151
 We convert the original scale of this item from (1 to 4) 
to (-1.5 to +1.5) then multiply the later by -1, thus the final version indicates more 
confident in one‟s abilities towards the positive pole. Age is the main predictor factor that 
is used in continuous terms, and I run the regression for each wave among those who are 
less than 35 years old as well. Moreover, we use number of controls including income, 
education, gender and place of residency.   
Table 3.5 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Political Efficacy in Egypt at 2011 and 2013 
 2011  2013 
 Full Sample Below 35  Full Sample Below 35 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
Age -0.003   0.001  
 (0.002)   (0.002)  
Income 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.012 0.017  0.029* 0.045** 
 (0.017) (0.020)  (0.017) (0.020) 
Urban 0.100 0.092  0.058 0.038 
 (0.063) (0.077)  (0.061) (0.074) 
Gender (=female) -0.209*** -0.170*  -0.019 -0.076 
 (0.068) (0.087)  (0.065) (0.081) 
Intercept  2.054*** 1.814***  1.738*** 1.744*** 
 (0.124) (0.078)  (0.138) (0.093) 
R2 0.020 0.015  0.006 0.015 
N 708 439  759 464 
Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: AB Waves II and III 
 
Table 3.5 shows regression results for factors affecting political efficacy attitudes 
in Egypt between 2011 and 2013. Our assumption that such attitudes are influenced by 
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age cannot be assessed as such correlation was very weak and insignificant. Among the 
control variables, being female in 2011 decreases confidence in political abilities by 
0.170 at 99% confidence level among the younger generation; and this is a general 
remark in post-2011 that women were marginalized from politics with the rise of Islamist 
parties as result of the political vacuum following the fall of Mubarak regime. Moreover, 
education is robust in 2013 in explaining confidence attitudes and such effect I believe is 
attributed to the effect of urbanism as well.  
To sum up, political orientations‟ parameters showed little support for age in 
explaining much of its variance. High level of politicization in the Egyptian society in the 
post-2011 settings decreases gaps among age cohorts, where political interest escalation 
is due to intra-cohort change. As for political trust age was a weak predicator in explain 
distrust among youth although reported, and the profile of low-income young Egyptian 
was statistically insignificant to be proven. On the other hand, high education and 
masculinity only proved to be relevant to explain political efficacy attitudes among 
Egyptian youth in between 2011 and 2013. 
3.2 Democratic Values 
Almond and Verba in their historic book “Civic Culture” argued that stable 
democracies come to existence through the equilibrium between acts of democratic 
institutions and public expectations.
152
 This influential school of thought has been always 
dominant in the study of democratic attitudes and democratic stability in the developed 
world. Consequently, many political scientists have proposed models for testing such 
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enduring hypothesis.
153
 This assumption holds that democracy tend to stabilize, when 
citizens‟ demand for democracy equates institutional supply of it. Scholars of political 
culture holds that high level of support of democracy results in institutional breakthrough 
and that such support is an integral ingredient for sustaining democracy.
154
  
However, such model of democratic supply and demand receives little empirical 
support when empirically tested in cross-national studies developed through the WVS 
successive surveys.
155
 Moreover, the same trend is present when analyzing democratic 
support in the Arab world, where high support for democracy did not result in 
democratization or institutional change per se. Results from the AB I and II support such 
earlier findings through the works of both Mark Tessler and Amaney Jamal.
156
  
In this section, I hold Lingling Qi and Doh Shin‟s assumption that democratic 
demand is two-dimensional conception that comprises support and dissatisfaction with 
democracy at the same time.
157
 In this view skepticism towards democratic political 
system is not a threat for democracy in principle. On the contrary, it can be perceived as a 
qualification for improving democratic practices per se. However, in Egypt where 
democracy was never tested for enough time to consider dissatisfaction with it as a mean 
of its modification, I believe that such indicator serve to provide a comprehensive picture 
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of democratic attitudes among young Egyptians. Moreover, since demand for democracy 
is procedural in MENA and in Egypt particularly, I detect the level of authoritarian 
support as well. 
Hence, in this section I start by analyzing levels of pro-authoritarian attitudes, 
satisfaction with the political system and finally predict support for democracy based on 
the earlier qualifications. As many scholars believed that the main derive for the 2011 
uprising is youth‟s aspiration for freedom and democracy. 
Pro-Authoritarian Support 
To detect the generational differences regarding authoritarian support, I run 
regression. In which, I use an additive scale of pro-authoritarian attitudes composing two 
variables from AB data on 2011 and 2013 conducted in Egypt. This scale included 
questions on the inadequacy of democracy to protect civil liberties, and having rulers in 
power with no elections.
158
 Both items were associated on reliability check at α=0.529 at 
2011 and α=0.538 at 2013, at p<0.05. Questions were suited by reversing the item on 
rulers with no elections, to indicate higher level of support for authoritarian attitudes at 
the positive pole. The reason for choosing these kinds of measures is availability across 
the data sets for comparison reason. Moreover, I ran regressions on two steps, one for the 
whole sample explained by age, and other for those who ages less than 35 years old, 
controlling for other factors. Controls are standardized across waves that portray 
demographic parameters such as age, income, education and place of residency. 
Table 3.6 shows a little association between age and pro-authoritarian attitudes in 
the Egyptian society, where it only explains 0.004 decrease in it at 90% confidence level 
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in 2011 with no evidence in 2013, while being female is important right after the 
revolution for holding progressive anti-authoritarian values among ordinary Egyptian and 
the young generation as well. Moreover, being Urban and young has a considerable 
impact on decreasing authoritarian attitudes by 0.167 at 90% confidence interval at 2011. 
In 2013, and during the Islamist reign in Egypt, urbanism still plays a robust predictor for 
less support for democracy and its effect increases in the case of youth by 0.206 at 90% 
confidence level if compared to the status in 2011.  Other, education qualifies to explain 
much of less support for such attitudes among all Egyptians in 2013. 
Table 3.6 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Authoritarian attitudes in Egypt at 2011-2013 
 2011  2013 
 Full Sample Below 35  Full Sample Below 35 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
Age -0.004*   0.003  
 (0.003)   (0.003)  
Income 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Education -0.013 0.011  -0.045* -0.043 
 (0.020) (0.024)  (0.025) (0.030) 
Urban -0.029 -0.167*  -0.281*** -0.206* 
 (0.074) (0.094)  (0.088) (0.112) 
Gender (=female) -0.324*** -0.244**  0.056 -0.093 
 (0.081) (0.105)  (0.095) (0.124) 
Intercept 3.132*** 2.909***  3.469*** 3.621*** 
 (0.145) (0.095)  (0.198) (0.141) 
R2 0.032 0.033  0.038 0.034 
N 707 436  728 447 
    Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses  
    * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
   Source: AB Waves II and III 
 
Satisfaction with Political System 
In this section, we aim to show variation among Egyptians by generations in 
respect to their confidence and satisfaction in the regimes performance at 2011 and 2013 
through an OLS regression. The two-items used in this scale deal with confidence of 
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Egyptians in their government, armed forces at the times in which the AB survey was 
conducted.
159
 The items correlated on the reliability scale at α=0.503 in 2011, p<0.01, 
where the positive pole on the additive scale indicates more satisfaction with the political 
system. The reason for choosing such items is their availability over waves, and because 
both the military and government are considered to be direct cause for regime satisfaction 
attitudes in respective literature. And we ruled out analysis for 2013, government at that 
time represented an ideological government, and the army had its own independent 
position from the ruling Islamists elite during the period in which the data was collected. 
Moreover, I ran regressions on two steps, one for the whole sample explained by age, and 
other for those who ages less than 35 years old, controlling for other factors. Controls are 
standardized across waves that portray demographic parameters such as age, income, 
education and place of residency. 
Table 3.7 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Regime Satisfaction in Egypt at 2011 
 Full Sample Below 35  
 Model 1 Model 2  
Age 0.016***   
 (0.003)   
Income 0.000 0.000  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Education 0.006 -0.016  
 (0.023) (0.025)  
Urban -0.307*** -0.233**  
 (0.085) (0.099)  
Gender (=female) -0.185** -0.127  
 (0.092) (0.110)  
Constant 6.589*** 7.398***  
 (0.167) (0.099)  
R2 0.067 0.025  
N 709 440  
                           Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses 
                           * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
                           Source AB Waves II  
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Results from table 3.7 for factors affecting regime satisfaction attitudes show that 
age is positively correlated with high level of confidence in political system. Where it 
explains increase in support by 0.016 in 2011, which is low indeed, yet it provides an 
insight on the rule of thumb logic that as person ages, his satisfaction with the status quo 
increases. Urbanism continue to be a decisive factor in the Egyptian case, where its 
robustness in explain less degree of satisfaction with regime performance reaches 0.233 
in explaining such attitudes among youth. Gender shows negative association in 2011 
which matches the rule of thumb that women who face more structural hardships are 
more likely to show less satisfaction with respective political system.  
Democratic Support  
In this section, I aim to test Lingling Qi and Doh Shin‟s argument on reasons 
behind democratic support. Thus, I assume that lower levels of regime satisfaction and 
authoritarian attitudes is direly related to the increase demand on democracy, and then 
test such argument on Egyptian youth between in 2011. 
Hypothesis 1: The less authoritarian attitudes, the higher democratic demand 
Hypothesis 2: less levels of regime satisfaction is related to democratic demand 
For regression, I constructed a democratic support additive scale from AB dataset 
on Egypt at 2011, including questions on democratic performances in relation to 
economy, marinating order, inclusivity and if it is the most preferred political system by 
respondents.
160
 Items correlated at α=0.919 at 2011 p<0.1.  Items were reversed, thus 
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positive pole indicates more democratic support. I use similar set of demographic controls 
used in earlier sections. 
Table 3.8 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Democratic Support in Egypt in 2011 
 Full Sample Full Sample Below 35 Below 35 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Age -0.002 -0.002   
 (0.007) (0.011)   
Pro-Authoritarian  0.395***  0.420***  
 (0.097)  (0.122)  
Regime Satisfaction  -0.326***   -0.202* 
 (0.084)   (0.117) 
Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education -0.010 -0.037 -0.037 -0.035 
 (0.052) (0.064) (0.060) (0.062) 
Urban 0.456** 0.460* 0.498** 0.404 
 (0.194) (0.242) (0.238) (0.247) 
Gender (=female) -0.163 0.232 0.368 0.237 
 (0.214) (0.273) (0.270) (0.279) 
Intercept 8.306*** 7.173*** 5.811*** 8.515*** 
 (0.728) (0.630) (0.432) (0.898) 
R2 0.060 0.012 0.040 0.020 
N 653 415 412 404 
Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: AB Wave II 
 
 
Table 3.8 shows factors affecting popular democratic demand among Egyptian 
youth in post-2011 epoch, results are informative given the high level of political 
instability the country has pushed through reflected on values. Results show that 
democratic support is not a function of age across all models. Surprisingly, pro-
authoritarian attitudes explain much of the support for democracy in full samples and 
among the youth. Democratic support increases due to an increase of 0.42 in 2011 at 99% 
confidence level. This striking finding stresses that democratic norms in Egypt still is 
different from the western societies, moreover during the times in which the surveys was 
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conducted both in June 2011, youth failed to organize themselves and allied with 
conventional powers in the society which is by virtue non-democratic. In another vein, 
regime satisfaction correlated negatively in 2011, which matches our original assumption. 
Other urbanism continues to be a robust measure in explaining such attitudes.  
Finally, I conclude this chapter by stating the findings aimed to be reached 
through analyzing several political and democratic indicators of Egyptian younger 
generation. Moreover, I believe this study is salient, as it presents for the first time 
different insights on the degree of fragmentation with the holistic bloc “youth” treated by 
many scholars and commentators. First, following the post-2011 events till the present 
moment, there is a high degree of politicization of all segments of the Egyptian society. 
Most importantly, from 2001 to 2008, may of the young generation have been under 
process of political socialization increased their interest in public affairs, which in part 
explains the 2011 uprising afterwards. However the post-uprising political attitudes are 
wed mainly to intra-cohort changes rather than generational replacement. 
Unlike the common logic that Egyptian youth feel more confident in their 
political abilities, results showed that age does not explain much attitudes in post-2011, 
however, higher levels of education and masculinity increaser the level of political 
efficacy. On the other hand, political trust as expected which works mainly in 
authoritarian contexts is negatively associated to attitudes shared by young Egyptians 
particularly in early 2013, before toppling down the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) backed 
government by the army during that summer.  
Finally, democratic attitudes works among Egypt in dissimilar fashion like rest of 
the world. However, it matches Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler‟s earlier work on the 
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procedural democratic aspirations in the region. The main feature that determines 
democratic demand among Egyptian youth is urbanism. I think it has to do with the 
cosmopolitan nature of living in big cities and exposure to alien ideas other than the 
traditional effects of conservative institutions in rural places. Moreover, support for 
authoritarianism explains much for democratic support, and it matches earlier findings in 
the region that democracy aspired in this part of the world is not liberal in the western 
sense and reflects a polarized situation among youth between 2011. 
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CHAPTER IV  
YOUTH RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL VALUES 
Social scientists such as Weber and Durkheim have argued since the late 
nineteenth century that conventional religious attachments are fading as result of 
modernization thus to be regarded the central thesis of social inquiry during that period of 
time; however MENA region along other parts of the world raised skepticism over the 
former thesis after the “Six-Days” war of 1967 and “Yom Kippur” war 1973.161  Much of 
the writings stemmed from the Arab region regard the above mentioned events to be the 
base line of religious revival in the Middle East after the successive secularization 
attempts carried out by post-colonial regimes in the region such as Nasser in Egypt and 
Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia. Moreover, since levels of socioeconomic development 
varied across the region and within societies, I believe that it did not yield such universal 
trend of secularism as argued by modernization theorists before.  
In another vein, literature on the propensity towards religiosity in the Middle East 
is descriptive and anecdotal; it does not attempt to produce systematic generalizable 
models of explanation. In addition, it does not focus on the individual-level as basic unit 
of analysis to explain difference and variations particularly within generations.
162
 
Moreover, less writings focus on the interplay between religious attitudes and events of 
the Arab spring 2011. As Islam plays an important role in agitating and mobilization 
protests as part of decreasing the costs given the developed sense of religious solidarity 
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among protestors.
163
 Thus, the underlying assumption in this chapter that religion “Islam” 
plays an important role in affecting people political  and social attitudes in MENA and 
particularly in Egypt and we expect to find a relationship between piety and political 
activism in Egypt. Furthermore, drawing on our original thesis quest of generational 
value replacement in Egypt, I aim to uncover such complicated thesis through assessing 
the degree in which religion affects youth‟s political attitudes towards protesting, support 
for religious movements and gender equality. As findings from earlier chapters that 
demographic predictors is indeed in interplay with traditional influences and I believe 
that Islam plays an important role in that sense.   
4.1 Debating Religiosity 
Despite the universality of the secularization thesis argued by many social 
thinkers and modernization theorists since the beginning of the last century, the 1990s 
sparked a continuing wave of criticism for the fade of religiosity thesis. Secularization 
thesis depended heavily in its explanation on evidence from the developed western 
hemisphere of the world, yet various anomalies within such part of the world mainly the 
United States of America proved to be an attention-grabbing deviant case coupled revival 
of religious spiritually in Europe and the rise of violent radical religious-based 
movements in the Muslim World. New trends of right-wing voting in Europe and 
sectarian politics in MENA further emphasize such skepticism over the decline of 
religion thesis prophecy advocated during most of the past century. Several questions 
were raised after the 9/11 attacks to explain the “Bin Laden” phenomenon who was 
basically rich and well educated, still managed to lead one of the most radical violent 
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religious-based movement worldwide. Socioeconomic factors failed to predict and 
explain such rich-based fundamentalism trend in the Arab World which opens the door 
for more cultural-based explanations tracing individual-level attitudes and the propensity 
for religious attachments.  
There are two competing paradigms in explaining religiosity and its revival in 
literature; one is “bottom-up” theories suggesting that societies regardless of their type of 
religious attachments will lose interest in religion given the change in existential security 
status as consequence of socioeconomic development.
165
 On the other hand, “top-down” 
explanations argue that demand for religion is cross-nationally constant at any given 
point of time, what controls the level of religiosity is the supply from religious 
institutions and leaders in which they maintain the spiritual attachments among 
individuals. 
Drawing on the earlier distinction, Weber –an advocate of the secularization 
thesis- developed a thesis on the loss of faith in religions based on the mounting 
rationality among humans given the scientific advancements that confound religion in 
different aspects.
166
 This Eurocentric vision of the redoing role of churches and priests is 
owed to the technological advancements such as the Darwinism evolution thesis that 
challenges the biblical interpretations.
167
 Moreover, such view regards the mystical 
explanations of religion is to lose its importance due to growing logical expansion of 
biology, quantum physics and chemistry. However, Weberian thesis is hard to prove 
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given empirical findings and it did not account for the undeveloped parts of the world in 
which science is still at its least status. Another related explanation is the “Functional-
Religion” theory that regards religion not to be only sets of metaphysical beliefs and 
norms; rather it is a scheme of activities that identifies one‟s identity and route in life 
from cradle to grave.
168
 Durkheim who laid the seminal foundations of religious 
functionalism see that religion primarily is aimed at maintaining social cohesion and 
providing collective benefits in forms of endowment and church-related services. 
However industrialized societies are marked by functional differentiation where 
professions are devoted for providing social services, health care and security thus to 
replace the conventional roles done by the churches. In his description, such development 
is arguably to lead for the loss of purpose for religious attachments and support.   
Such western explanations for religious attachments have been criticized 
especially in the past couple of decades from theories stemming from the same rational 
scheme of thought as well. Scholars such as Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge 
argues in contrary to Durkheim that religious plurality among Christianity led to 
fortifying religious attachments as the demand for religion is constant among human 
beings.
169
 The theory of “Religious Markets” assumes that the more religious 
denominations are in rivalry, the more likely for religious institutions to exert more effort 
to keep their followers and effect.  Such theory is valid according to its origin in the 
developed world that is predominantly Christian marked by different denominations and 
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history of church domination over the medieval ages, yet explaining religiosity in the 
Muslim world and Middle East region –for me- is due to different set of reasons.  
Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart developed a secularization theory that is based 
mainly on the level of existential security in given society, however it accounts also for 
the persistence of cultural traditions in keeping religious faith in tact in different parts of 
the world.
170
 Their first core assumption lies on security in which richer nations are 
expected to be more secure in terms of economic as well as direct material one. This has 
a direct effect on the existential security that affects one‟s cognitive abilities to think and 
question societal norms, thus in richer nations secular-rational norms tend to be the most 
dominant. The other underlying axiom that Norris and Inglehart‟s theory depends on is 
cultural traditions; according to this view accumulative value change is path dependent 
on contrary to viewing it as an iron law applied to all universal cases. The latter universal 
view in debating religion in societies is yet having never been tested in the 
underdeveloped world, although it accounts for it. In the next section, I analyze the role 
of Islam in shaping values and the symptoms of religiosity in Egypt especially among the 
youth and its expected implications on supporting religious movements, political activism 
and gender equality.  
4.2 Religious Revival in Egypt 
During the 1960s, Egypt was on the track of modernism in the western sense that 
included secularism highlighted with the confrontation between the state and religious 
organizations mainly the MB and coupled with the nationalization of the Al-Azhar. 
However the post-1967 war with Israel led to revisiting the Islamic influence in Egypt 
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due to the loss of faith in secularism and the end of pan Arabism. Islamic revival was at 
its peak in MENA and Egypt during much of the 1970s and 1980s.
171
 Coupled with the 
state desire to confront leftist-Nasserists, students become Islamized in which some took 
violent roots heightened by the assassination of Egypt‟s president Anwar Al-Sadat in 
1981. Girls starting wearing veil in a contrasting feature to their mothers who did not 
adopt such custom during much of the twentieth century.
172
 Features of Islamization 
continued during much of the twentieth century as result of the petrodollar effect coming 
from cultural remittances from the ultra-conservative Gulf States. 
Egyptian state as mentioned above has utilized religion in different ways to keep 
its influence and sustain legitimacy in the post-colonial ear. Egypt scored 62.92 with the 
third rank in the Middle East on the index of government involvement in religion 
(GIR).
173
 This index measures the degree of government involvement in religious affairs 
based on a combined five factor scores of the official function of religion in a given state, 
state‟s treatment for all religions, minority religious freedom, regulation of the 
majoritarian religion, and the degree in which laws depends on religion. Moreover, one 
cannot explain the religious revival without accounting for the transforming role of the 
historic Egyptian main Islamic institution “Al-Azhar” and its clergy “Ulema.” Starting 
from 1961, the nature of education at Al-Azhar has been qualitatively and quantitatively 
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under severe change.
174
 First, introducing non-religious subjects led to changing the 
cognitive perception of the Ulema to face the long-lasting controversy of science and 
religion and the need to deal with such puzzle. Other through institutionalizing it to be a 
public university –with the remarkable increase of student enrollment as showed in Table 
4.1- led to delegitimizing its sacred nature that Al-Azhar‟s Ulema have always utilized to 
keep their influence in the society.  
Table 4.1 Expansion of Al-Azhar‟s Institutions and Student Body 
Year Number of Institutes Number of Students 
1962-63 212 64,390 
1972-73 1,265 89,744 
1982-83 1,273 302,044 
1987-88 2,053 517,968 
1992-93 3,161 966,629 
Malika Zeghal, “Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulema of Al-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the 
State (1952-1994),” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 31, 1999, p. 379 
Moreover, modernization of Al-Azhar opened a venue for its political role 
welcomed by the state during much of the 1960s and 1970s. Such political activism was 
intensified with the rise of fundamental Islamism during the 1970s till the moment of 
assassination of Sheik Al-Dahabi in 1977.
175
 However since many other Islamist factions 
challenged its legitimacy mainly the MB and fundamentalists, Al-Azhar Ulema became 
more politically involved than ever during the 1970s; coupled with a divergence within 
its clergy body itself. The presence of religious competition led to the creation of 
peripheral Ulema apart from the official coopted ones, thus their political role diversified 
in consequence as well. Some Al-Azhar clergy as well became radicalized and theorized 
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for terrorism as Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman who is currently under life imprisonment in 
the U.S.
176
  
Another explanation for the rise of religiosity in Egypt among youth since the 
1970s that continue till this day is the malfunctioning nature Arab States. Nazih Ayubi 
argued that Arab states are alien structures created by foreign powers rather than national 
bourgeoisies. Hence, these post-colonial structures are over-stated in sense of the 
supremacy of the formal apparatus in relation to other non-state actors; this hinders the 
role of intermediary institutions such as civil society in fostering democracy.
177
 Although 
in Egypt, President Sadat in 1980 passed a constitutional amendment stating that Sharia 
(Islamic Jurisprudence) is the main source of legislation as Islam is the official religion of 
the state, to face the rising wave of Islamism in society. However, Egypt burdened with 
huge defense public spending due to the successive wars with Israel abstained from its 
nation-building tasks, and more importantly from building national consensus regarding 
controversial foundations of the state.
178
 Public space in Egypt following Sadat‟s 
“Manaber” plurality conception integrated only state‟s coopted/loyal elites allowing no 
other venues for opposition expect the grassroots social service work. In this sense, 
Islamists‟ role was growing especially with recruiting the young who were attracted to 
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the charitable work coupled with “da‟wa” (preaching for Islam) in the absence of the 
state‟s role in providing for social services.179  
In this context, Islamist grassroots movements have been functioning with an 
attractive platform offering an alternative for the restrictive Egyptian regime. Following 
the toppling down of Mubarak in 2011, the main Islamist opposition movement (MB) 
with their long history of providing social services in marginalized areas capitalized such 
social activism to a political power and won both parliamentary and presidential elections 
in 2011 and 2012. The logic behind such social activism is rooted in Islamist movements‟ 
doctrine, according to the teachings of Hassan Al-Banna –MB founder-  reforming 
society is a lengthy process that has to start with preparing an Islamic individual, family 
and then community.
180
  Such doctrine attract young men who get education, spiritual and 
social training through practicing Islam in wider sense.  
Combating the un-Islamic state of Egypt, various Islamist movements from MB to 
Salafis or Sufis; focused on social work to gain support and recognition from ordinary 
Egyptians and in particular the youth.
181
 Islamic charity filled the diminishing role of the 
indebted Egyptian state that adopted the IMF structural adjustment plan. For instance, it 
is estimated that 2,457 Islamic charity organizations were in function in Egypt at 2003. 
This trend of charitable work is very important in underrating religious revival in Egypt if 
taken comprehensively in a wider context of the rise of political Islam.
182
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Egyptian youth have been suffering from identity crisis since the 1967 defeat and 
the fade of Pan-Arabism. As such Islamism provided a solution for those who are 
struggling to define themselves as Muslims in the light of the Egyptian-Israeli peace 
agreement of 1978. Individual religiosity provided a compromise for young Egyptians 
coupled with economic hardships due to the uneven socioeconomic distribution in the 
society.
183
 The ICT advancements and social networking helped in fortifying such 
sentiments as well; still it is a hard exercise to map youth Egyptian religious attachments 
and whether it means a break from the religious establishments or it still attached 
somehow to the pre-2011 Islamists movement‟s doctrine. Thus, my quest in the next 
sections to map attitudes regarding supporting political Islam, participating in protests 
based on Islamic justification and gender equality.  
4.3 Religious Effects  
As mentioned above this central section in this chapter aims at mapping outcomes 
of youth religious attitudes in Egypt and its implications on supporting political Islam, 
mobilization/ political activism. All these aspects are theoretically challenged on religious 
basis, and my aim here to map such claims and test it in relation to the post-2011 settings 
especially among the youth in Egypt. 
Propensity to Support Political Islam 
Concept of political Islam is a theoretically debatable one; as there is no 
comprehensive definition for its underlying components. Historically political Islam is 
related to the rise of Islamist movements and parties that advocate the rule of Islamic 
                                                           
183
 Hani Awwad, “Religiously among the Youth: a Phenomenon Independent from the Ideological 
Establishment,” Research Paper Series, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (Doha Institute), 
November 2011, pp. 17-19.  
016 
 
jurisprudence in their respective societies; a clear example for that is the Islamic 
revolution regime in Iran in the post-1979 settings. One view to illuminate political Islam 
is treating it as a set of ideas that explains all aspects of life including political 
interactions, and societal rankings according to the laws of good “Shari‟a.”184 Thus 
supporters of political Islam have this universal belief that Islamic laws works for times 
and societies according to the same sacred pattern. Other scholars define it procedurally 
as set of actions that help political Islam supporters to provide a future imagination for a 
perfect Islamic community through re-applying the basic traditions and principles of the 
virtue ancestors.
185
  
Another contending view is to define Islamist movements as the cradle of political 
Islam we talk about in the sense of political activism. Identifying Islamist movements is 
yet a hard task to be done, and the blurry lines between fundamentalists, traditionalists, 
and Islamists are hard to draw. Even there is no clear definition for an Islamist, Muslim 
and Islamic scholar, if ruling the political objective out. Thus, Bjørn Utvik argued that 
there are three main key pillars for placing a movement into the Islamic category.
186
 One 
is the adherence to the ultimate rule of Shari‟a; other is identifying themselves as 
Islamists, and lastly the institutionalized nature of their work towards their goal. 
According to this former practical definition, many movements qualify to be considered 
as Islamist movement; however my quest in this section is more comprehensive to test 
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the propensity for supporting goals of political Islam among young Egyptians in the 
aftermath of the 2011 events. 
There are many reasons portrayed in the literature for supporting Islamist 
movements, one must theoretically differentiate between sympathy/support and actual 
casting votes for Islamist parties competing in pluralistic elections, if any. However, my 
aim here to focus on support for political Islam, and I develop a causal claim around piety 
and socioeconomic conditions that push ordinary citizens to support –at least sympathize- 
with Islamist political movements. Orientalists in their scholarship of the Middle East, 
have arguing that Islam provides a comprehensive instrument to explain and cope with 
different societal and political conditions; anyone can counter throughout his lifetime.
187
 
This develops my first casual examination here that those who are more pious tend to 
support political Islam as their conception of the unity of Islam, politics and social order 
intensifies such feelings and conviction. Moreover, I expect to see such relationship 
among the pious youth as well. 
Hypothesis 1: young pious Egyptians tend to support political Islam more than 
non-pious youth. 
Another rational for supporting political Islamist movements is the socioeconomic 
situation that individual face in his life. With profound history in charity, Islamist 
grassroots organizations in Egypt have been active over the last three decades in 
providing educational, health and financial support for different Egyptian stakeholders.
188
 
Thus, we expect to find a trend among those who suffer economically to be more 
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supportive for Islamist movements based on the casual claim mentioned above, coupled 
with it we add a control in the same sense that since the governments detained from 
providing for social services, those who distrust government more are likely to support 
political Islam. 
Hypothesis 2: young poor Egyptians are more likely to support political Islam. 
Hypothesis 3: The more level of government distrust among young Egyptians, the 
more likely to support political Islam. 
Finally, another reason for supporting political Islam is the demographic nature of 
youngsters. This hypothesis goes in both directions; the first is that the young, urban and 
well-educated with a certain degree of western exposure are less likely to support 
political Islam as Inglehart‟s theory of generational value change and its implications in 
industrialized societies towards secular-rational kind of values. On the other hand, Oliver 
Roy argues that among the proponents of militant Islamist movements are those who 
comprise the young elite in the society, where those who are well-educated facing harsh 
conditions to get recognition in the Egyptian society.
189
  Thus, we believe that education 
has dual effects.  
Hypothesis 4a: young Educated Egyptians tend to support political Islam 
Hypothesis 4b: young less-educated Egyptians tend to support political Islam 
Moreover, in order to further test the relationship between education, income and 
piety, I use set of interactions to control for the effect of piety on both income and 
education and its outcome on supporting political Islam in Egypt among the youth.  
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The analysis below aims at examining youth support for political Islam at two 
different points of time after the Arab Spring events in Egypt at 2011 and 2013 based on 
the data available from the Arab Barometer waves II and III.  The dependent variable 
used to measure propensity for political Islam is an additive scale variable of three 
different survey items as shown in figure 4.1, where the positive pole indicates more 
supportive attitudes towards political Islam.
190
 
Figure 4.1 Arab Barometer Items to measure Support for Political Islam 
Religious leaders should not interfere in voters‟ decisions in elections 
. 
 
Your country is better off if religious people hold public positions in the state. Reversed 
 
Religious leaders should have influence over government decisions. Reversed 
Note: AB Waves II and III (2011 and 2013) 
The main independent variables used in this analysis are a continuous variable for 
income measured in U.S dollars, and another for education categories, and a measure for 
piety that uses number of times in which the person reads Qur‟an.191 The reason for 
choosing this variable is its reasonability in measuring piety according the investigators 
of the Arab Barometer.
192
 And finally, a measure for government distrust that indicates 
respondents‟‟ distrust in government after reversing the original parameter.193  
For interactions, low income level denotes those who belong to the bottom 25% 
income quintile in respective datasets or in other words their income is less than 300 
Egyptian pounds in 2011 and 600 in 2013. As for education, we account for those who 
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hold above post-secondary degrees. Thus I multiply low income and high educated cases 
by our measure for piety.  
I use different set of controls including age as continuous and as category for 
those who are less than 35 years old, controlling for it on the sample level in our 
regression as this study‟s purpose is to account for youth political values in principal. 
Other, gender, place of residency, unemployment, and political interest are used. 
Unemployment is an additional control to help in predicting economic hardships and its 
effect on the outcome variable, while political interest, gives an overall view on the 
degree of political exposure to other ideas to see if it would effect on supporting political 
Islam. 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 below shows the OLS regression results for factors affecting 
support for political Islam for Egyptian youth at both 2011 and 2013. It reflects high 
degree of fragmentation in youth attitudes based on the political turbulences the country 
has gone through in post-2011 epoch. As we find no explanatory power for age in 
explaining such attitudes, I used a secondary step regression focusing only on the 
younger generation or those below the age of 35 years old. Higher income levels related 
really low in 2013 in explaining less support for political Islam. 
 As for interactions worked in our assumed propositions in 2011, yet it yielded 
insignificant statistical correlations. In 2013, due to the high level of politicization of the 
Egyptian society and divide among Islamists and secularists, such interactions worked in 
souring way. By adding their coefficients, those who are pious and poor actually showed 
less support for political Islam unlike our expectation by 1.14 at 99% confidence level; 
this has to do with the perception of the MB in power and the decrease in their services 
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delivery. In a similar fashion, piety worked in different ways, while it explained 0.184 
decrease in support for political Islam in 2011, it increased to explain 0.404 increase in 
political Islam during March 2013. Again this is an obvious effect for the degree of 
politicization and fragmentation among Egyptian youth prior to the 30
th
 of June protests. 
And the same goes for political interest which was robust measure across all models in 
both waves, however started by predicting less support in 2011 to high support in 2013.  
Thus, we can argue that high level of politicization and fragmentation among 
Egyptian youth actually challenges existing narratives in the literature; we find evidence 
for an interaction between low income and piety rather in showing less support for 
political Islam in 2013 and the same for high education. However, piety in itself has 
different effects in both cases. This we can assume that personal piety was a function of 
political polarization when the MB ruled the country in mid-2012. 
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Table 4.2 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Support for Political Islam in Egypt in 2011 
 Full Sample  Below 35 Below 35 Below 35 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Age -0.002    
 (0.005)    
Income -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Education 0.041 0.062  0.036 
 (0.041) (0.049)  (0.050) 
Post-Secondary    0.467  
   (0.515)  
Post-Secondary and Pious   -0.069  
   (0.145)  
Poor    0.417 
    (0.634) 
Poor and Pious    -0.103 
    (0.191) 
Individual Piety  -0.113 -0.184*   
 (0.079) (0.102)   
Gender(=female) -0.021 -0.001 -0.035 0.014 
 (0.175) (0.222) (0.223) (0.228) 
Urban -0.162 -0.147 -0.159 -0.215 
 (0.146) (0.185) (0.184) (0.184) 
Unemployed 0.005 0.096 0.076 0.085 
 (0.086) (0.106) (0.105) (0.106) 
Interest in Politics -0.456*** -0.546*** -0.569*** -0.586*** 
 (0.080) (0.097) (0.096) (0.097) 
Government Distrust  0.037 -0.029 -0.009 0.004 
 (0.078) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) 
Intercept  7.883*** 8.368*** 7.877*** 7.687*** 
 (0.431) (0.558) (0.469) (0.488) 
R2 0.078 0.109 0.103 0.095 
N 703 438 438 438 
Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: AB Wave II 
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Table 4.3 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Support for Political Islam in Egypt in 2013 
 Full Sample  Below 35 Below 35 Below 35 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Age -0.008    
 (0.006)    
Income -0.001* 0.000 0.000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Education -0.037 -0.107**  -0.106** 
 (0.040) (0.045)  (0.044) 
Post-Secondary   -1.417**  
   (0.613)  
Post-Secondary and Pious   0.269  
   (0.135)  
Poor    -4.511*** 
    (1.118) 
Poor and Pious    1.043*** 
    (0.245) 
Individual Piety  0.377*** 0.404***   
 (0.074) (0.099)   
Gender (=female) 0.271* 0.296 0.288 0.238 
 (0.158) (0.194) (0.198) (0.196) 
Urban  -0.189 0.054 -0.010 -0.005 
 (0.135) (0.167) (0.169) (0.165) 
Unemployed -0.020 -0.072 -0.015 -0.045 
 (0.085) (0.098) (0.099) (0.097) 
Political Interest  0.187** 0.221** 0.208** 0.222** 
 (0.075) (0.095) (0.097) (0.094) 
Government Distrust  0.581*** 0.549*** 0.561*** 0.593*** 
 (0.069) (0.083) (0.084) (0.082) 
Intercept 3.181*** 2.646*** 4.213*** 4.227*** 
 (0.440) (0.521) (0.328) (0.326) 
R2 0.170 0.165 0.135 0.168 
N 730 452 452 452 
Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: AB Wave III 
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Political Mobilization  
In this section, I aim to examine the role of religiosity and its effect on political 
mobilization among Egyptian youth, mainly participating in protests in the light of the 
Arab Spring events. Youth are considered the main agitator of the 2011 uprising and its 
subsequent protests calling for political liberalization and social equality throughout the 
last four years. The reason for such assumption is that in many of the Arab Spring states, 
Islamists took over power either through elections or through violent confrontation with 
the ancient regime. However, many commentators and scholars portrayed the Arab 
Spring at its commencement to be a non-Islamic spring calling for liberal values away 
from the religious and sub-national authoritarian settings of the Arab world.
194
  
On the other hand, other scholars such as Marc Lynch in his work on contentious 
politics in Egypt suggested that mosques were a decisive factor in mobilizing Egyptians 
especially the young to participate in the massive protests during January 2011.
195
 
Furthermore, following the 2011 events, Fridays were the main day for protests in Egypt 
till the present moment, and this adds to the role that Islam plays in agitating protest 
feelings. Thus, our aim to examine the Islamic component in political mobilization 
against the authoritarian regime among Egyptian youth, hence to be able to provide an 
explanation for the casual mechanisms behind the 2011 uprising in Egypt away from the 
direct socioeconomic causality.  
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Taking our aim at the theoretical level, on the casual mechanism between 
protesting as an outcome behavior and religion, several studies tackled such complicated 
linkage. One aspect as Amaney Jamal describes it is the communal aspect of participating 
in religious rituals, as it develops sense of homogeneity among religious denomination 
members through developing a united sense of solidarity.
196
 In the same sense, 
participation in protests in authoritarian is physically and emotionally costly given the 
force used by the incumbent regime, thus developing a religious spirit through communal 
participation is explanatory to understand protest mechanism. In this view, individual 
piety is less important than communal practices in explaining protesting behavior.
197
 
Another set of explanations are developed at the individual level on the effect of 
religion on protesting and political mobilization. One of them is the different aspects of 
religious participation on political engagement, while religious activism activates 
resources for collective action, while individual piety develops interest in politics, and 
sense of political distrust.
198
 Michael Hoffman and Jamal identified several pathways in 
which religion affect political mobilization.
199
 One is through building network of trust 
among the members of same religion or members of the same religious community 
through charitable services and continuous participation in religious rituals, which allow 
more political engagement. Another mechanism is through the joint prayers as the case of 
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“Friday” prayers in Islam that provides resources form collective action. And lastly, the 
nature of religious teachings itself, as all religions have a utopian conception of society 
that affects one‟s imagination of the society, thus open pathways for political 
engagement.  
Capitalizing on the discussion above and in order to examine the link between 
religiosity and political involvement in Egypt among youth, I developed number of 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: the more pious young Egyptians are likely to be politically active 
Hypothesis 2: attending religious communal practices increases the likelihood of 
political activism among Egyptian youth 
Hypothesis 3: the more the support of political Islam among Egyptian youth the 
more politically active they are. 
Building on that, the dependent variable measures political activism during the 
post-2011 epoch. Items are shown in fgure 4.2 where added up together to form a 
continuous variable since logistic regression.
200
  
Figure 4.2 Items measuring Political Activism during Arab Spring in 2013 
During the past three years, did you attend a meeting to discuss a subject or sign a petition? 
During the past three years, did you participate in a protest, march or sit-in? 
Note: AB Wave III (2013) 
As for the central independent variables, I use the same variables of individual 
piety and support for political Islam used in the previous section, in addition to a measure 
for communal religious practice, asking individual if they attend Friday prayers on a scale 
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order, the scale were reversed to indicate more communal practices towards the positive 
pole.
201
 Other control variables does not differ that much from the last section to include 
gender, education, income, unemployment and political interest, while age is inserted as 
continuous then control for the younger generations in the OLS regression models.  
Table 4.4 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Political Activism in Egypt in 2013 
 Full Sample Below 35 Below 35 Below 35 Below 35 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
piety -0.140*** -0.114** -0.060   
 (0.043) (0.057) (0.050)   
Political Islam 0.014 
(0.019) 
0.036 
(0.024) 
 0.026 
(0.024) 
 
Communal Practice 0.089* 0.079   0.028 
 (0.046) (0.056)   (0.050) 
Gender (=female) -0.039 -0.099 -0.093 -0.152 -0.063 
 (0.088) (0.109) (0.097) (0.102) (0.105) 
Education 0.088*** 0.105*** 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.102*** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployed -0.066 -0.035 -0.040 -0.042 -0.053 
 (0.043) (0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.050) 
Urban 0.119* 0.185** 0.186** 0.221*** 0.209** 
 (0.070) (0.086) (0.082) (0.085) (0.083) 
Political Interest 0.167*** 0.093* 0.119** 0.099* 0.121** 
 (0.040) (0.050) (0.048) (0.051) (0.049) 
Intercept  -0.398* -0.452* -0.193* -0.516** -0.527** 
 (0.231) (0.286) (0.219) (0.201) (0.235) 
R2 0.140 0.141 0.137 0.139 0.142 
N 724 450 476 454 474 
Note: standard errors in parentheses  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: AB Wave III 
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Results from table 4.6 suggest that our main independent variables including 
political Islam do not explain much of the variation in regard to examining the relation 
between religiosity and political activism for the youth in Egypt. Only individual piety 
explains the outcome of political activism at its highest of (-0.114) at 95% confidence 
level when it comes to those who are younger than 35, however it goes against our 
original hypothesis that individual piety affects political activism in positive manner. 
Moreover, communal practices scores relatively low at the full sample at (0.089) at 90% 
confidence level with high standard error of 0.046, thus the precision of such explanation 
is under question in explaining political activism during the Arab spring events in Egypt. 
Other control variables as rules of thumb suggests explain much of the reasons to be 
politically active in a robust way. Higher education levels increases the propensity for 
youth political activism. Moreover, urbanism is another robust measure that explains 
much of youth activism; with no other controls it explains 0.185 involvement at 95% 
confidence level.  
4.4 Youth and Gender Equality 
Samuel Huntington along with other orientalists stressed on the incompatibility of 
Islam with democracy and related values. His “Clash of Civilization” thesis mapped this 
perception on Islam and its utility in regard to democracy and gender equality that is 
invalid among Muslims.
202
 On the other hand, scholars from the Middle East stressed on 
the tolerant nature of Islam, especially when it comes to protecting women rights. This 
gave rise to the appearance of Islamist feminism line of thought; Heba Raouf argued that 
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western orientalists tend to portray Islam an obstacle for gender tolerance, yet there is a 
grey area adopting that Islam can be compatible with democracy and gender equality in 
its heart.
203
 Within these competing paradigms this section evolves in its attempt to 
explain gender equality attitudes among Egyptian youth based on religious explanatory 
factors. Taking into consideration the modernization stances on the linkage between low 
levels of socio-economic development and gender tolerance or democratic attitudes; this 
section aims at assessing the religious factors that affect gender tolerance as a measure of 
democratic support among Egyptian youth in post-2011 settings. 
As mentioned above, the cultural school argues that Islam is not compatible with 
granting women rights, as the values of Muslims and the west are totally different from 
one another. In that sense, some scholars argue that Islamic teachings provide structural 
hindrances for women rights and equality within Muslim communities.
204
 Moreover, as 
Huntington argued other cultures than the western one denounces human individualism to 
focus on the collective aspect of society, thus freedom in general is an inferior concept 
including women in their respective society.
205
 
On the other hand, Muslim scholars stressed that actually Islam emancipated 
women historically from the Jahlia or ignorance before its arrival in the Arabian 
Peninsula. Islam favored gender equality, for instance constraints on “polygamy,” 
mentioned in Quran are hard to overcome when it comes to reality. And for women 
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inheritance which is half to male siblings was very liberating at the time of revelation in 
contrast to the Arabian pre-Islamic context. 
In post-2011, many Egyptian women movements voiced out gender inequality, 
and organized several campaigns against “sexual harassment,” such as “HarrasMap” and 
“Women‟s Revolution in the Arab World.” Hence, my aim in this section is to test if 
religion is linked to gender tolerance. Thus to assume that when public opinion support 
for a certain  cause; institutional breakthrough is likely to take place as result, as in the 
cases of environmentalism in Northern Europe. Thus, I use two aspects of piety, as used 
in earlier sections, one I related to the individual level of religiosity and the other is 
related to supporting Islamist movements. We expect to find a negative relationship 
between piety and the support for gender equality.  
Hypothesis 1: More pious young Egyptians less supportive for gender tolerance.  
Hypothesis 2: More support for Islamist movements means less support for 
gender tolerance.  
Another aspect that I want to test is the effect of western value system and its 
effect on young Egyptian attitudes towards gender equality. Most of the political rhetoric 
on promoting gender tolerance in the Muslim world and Egypt originated by western 
governments; different western international donors condition their aid to Egypt based on 
empowering women in society. Thus, those who see gender equality ideas as western 
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form of neo-colonialism other than traditional military invasion are expected to be more 
reluctant to accept ideas related to gender tolerance.
 207
 
Hypothesis 3: the more anti-western feelings the less support for gender tolerance  
In order to test such hypotheses, I use OLS regression to predict the religious 
factors explaining gender tolerance at both 2011 and 2013. The dependent variable as 
figure 4.3 shows is constructed on a scale based on additive scale from the Arab 
Barometer survey at 2011 and 2013, where more support for gender equality is directed 
towards the positive pole of the scale.
208
  
Figure 4.3 Arab Barometer Items measuring Gender Equality in Egypt in 2011 and 2013 
A married woman can work outside the home Reversed 
In general, men are better at political leadership than women  
University education for males is more important than university education for females 
Note: AB Wave II and III  
As for central independent variables, I use the same variables used to measure 
piety and support political Islam, while for anti-western feelings, I use an item that asks 
respondent to show their opinion regarding violent acts against the U.S as result of their 
interference in the Arab world.
209
 Other controls, do not differ that much from the earlier 
sections to include gender, education, income, unemployment and political interest, while 
age is inserted as continuous then control for the younger generations in the OLS 
regression models.  
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Table 4.5 OLS Regression for Factors affecting Gender Equality in Egypt in 2011 
 Full Sample Below 35 Below 35 Below 35 Below 35 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Age -0.002     
 (0.005)     
Political Islam -0.053 -0.038 -0.041   
 (0.038) (0.050) (0.049)   
Individual Piety  0.167** 0.071  0.112  
 (0.079) (0.105)  (0.103)  
Anti-Americanism -0.293*** -0.342***   -0.334*** 
 (0.072) (0.092)   (0.092) 
Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.008 -0.010 0.006 0.003 -0.014 
 (0.042) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
Gender (=female) 1.850*** 1.683*** 1.645*** 1.575*** 1.686*** 
 (0.181) (0.236) (0.225) (0.225) (0.235) 
Urban 0.066 0.240 0.272 0.224 0.264 
 (0.148) (0.193) (0.187) (0.187) (0.190) 
Political Interest 0.241*** 0.326*** 0.267*** 0.304*** 0.382*** 
 (0.083) (0.105) (0.101) (0.098) (0.099) 
Unemployed  -0.025 -0.056 -0.011 -0.052 -0.066 
 (0.088) (0.110) (0.107) (0.108) (0.110) 
Constant 6.533*** 6.468*** 5.873*** 5.200*** 6.290*** 
 (0.513) (0.645) (0.486) (0.394) (0.408) 
R2 0.225 0.204 0.158 0.151 0.199 
N 679 423 446 452 425 
Note: standard errors in parentheses  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: AB Wave II 
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Table 4.6 OLS Regression for Religious Factors affecting Gender Equality in Egypt in 2013 
 Full Sample Below 35 Below 35 Below 35 Below 35 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Age 0.013*     
 (0.007)     
Political Islam  -0.081* -0.102* -0.141***   
 (0.044) (0.062) (0.052)   
Individual Piety  -0.129 -0.166  -0.148  
 (0.092) (0.131)  (0.118)  
Anti-Americanism 0.034 -0.029   -0.082 
 (0.083) (0.111)   (0.113) 
Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.039 -0.032 0.000 0.009 -0.024 
 (0.050) (0.061) (0.053) (0.054) (0.062) 
Gender (=female) 0.848*** 0.663** 0.581** 0.534** 0.611** 
 (0.196) (0.259) (0.229) (0.232) (0.265) 
Urban -0.127 -0.002 0.186 0.186 0.051 
 (0.163) (0.216) (0.190) (0.195) (0.220) 
Political Interest 0.096 0.034 0.102 0.061 -0.042 
 (0.094) (0.127) (0.112) (0.113) (0.130) 
Unemployed -0.094 0.088 0.039 -0.025 -0.011 
 (0.107) (0.131) (0.114) (0.117) (0.134) 
Constant 8.029*** 9.269*** 8.467*** 8.326*** 8.500*** 
 (0.541) (0.667) (0.449) (0.521) (0.490) 
R2 0.043 0.039 0.036 0.020 0.020 
N 634 381 460 481 396 
Note: standard errors in parentheses  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: AB Wave III 
 
Results from tables 4.8 and 4.9 shows that religious factors works in different 
ways among Egyptian youth at 2011 and 2013 due the polarization taking place in the 
society in the post-2011 events; for instance piety explains supporting gender equality by 
0.167 at 95% confidence level in 2011 in contrast to our original hypothesis, while it has 
no effect in 2013. Anti-American sentiments explain less support for gender equality in 
024 
 
2011. Anti-American sentiments are very robust especially among the youth, if no other 
independent factor was added, while it provides no significance in 2013. 
Support for political Islam is a robust measure to explain about 0.14 less support 
for gender tolerance if no other independent factor is added in 2013 at 99% confidence 
level. This has to do with the changing nature of the Egyptian political formula at the 
time in which the survey was conducted. During the MB rule, they showed less support 
for women empowerment in society and their share in shaping public policies.  Other, 
being female and showing political interest is robust factors across all models for the 
whole sample and the younger generation to explain more support for gender equality at 
99% confidence level in 2011 and in 2013, it robustly explains much of the support, 
while age works in dissimilar way, as those who are old more supportive for gender 
equality, when controlling for education and income in 2013. This provides a surprising 
fact that being young does not mean necessarily adopting liberal values reflected in 
gender equality.  
To conclude this chapter, I state the main remarks we can draw from this chapter. 
It provides an interplay on youth social, activism and religious values in the post-2011 
epoch in Egypt. Earlier chapters prove that Egyptian youth fall behind international and 
rather regional trends in terms of adopting values on the postmaterialist standardized 
index. I hypothesized that religion plays a salient role in predicting such attitudes. Thus, I 
draw some conclusions that I believe worth highlighting and open the door for future 
research beyond the scope of this thesis. As presented, Egyptian youth with doubt can be 
considered as one liberal bloc in the western sense. Youth in Egypt ere historically 
involved in the waves of Islamic revival since the early 1980s and the rise of violent 
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militant Islamic groups. Assassination of Egypt‟s late president Sadat is an example for 
that. Exploring the propensity for young Egyptians to support Islamist movements in the 
post-2011 settings, I find no evidences for deprivation motives, may be it can be related 
to voting behavior that was not assessed in this study, where actually the interaction 
between low income and piety yields less support for political Islam. It entails that there 
is separation between Islam in the public and private spheres. However, Egyptian youth 
who showed support for political Islam are divided based on the effect of higher 
education levels even if they are pious and the same holds for distrusting governments, 
which I think is chronic symptom of the post-independence Egyptian state. Other effects 
were dismissed from analysis due to data availably such as the effect of transnational 
petro-dollar from the Gulf States that I think explains much of the religious revivalism in 
the Egyptian society. 
Other, participating in the 2011 uprising and its subsequent waves of protest and 
political activism among youth during the last four years is not explained by piety. In part 
communal practices such as mosque attendance explain part of such mobilization, yet not 
in a very coherent way. On the other hand, youth demographics determine much of such 
activism which typically includes urbanism and interest in politics. Finally, age actually 
works in an opposite direction in explain gender tolerance as one of the most liberal value 
as argued by many scholars. Thus, youth show an overall level of traditionalism when it 
comes to supporting gender equality. Moreover, young Egyptians who hold anti-western 
feelings in 2011 and support the MB and related Islamist movements in 2013 show 
higher degree for gender intolerance.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this concluding chapter is to present findings from previous sections 
and chapters in relevance to the study‟s main quest of tracing generational value 
differences in Egypt and its explanatory power in relation to the 2011 uprising. In doing 
such task, I start by drawing features of youth fragmentation and then account for the role 
of generational value change in relation to the Arab spring.  
5.1 Fragmentation of Egyptian Youth 
We started the analysis contesting the common assumption that youth in Egypt 
cannot be rendered one holistic bloc, yet it encompasses different parts. Moreover, this 
study challenged claims on youth features in MENA to be liberal and secular, thus those 
who agitated the 2011 uprising were actually angry youth facing different structural 
hardships as argued by several scholars such as John Esposito. This study aimed to 
explore youth values in Egypt in relation to both its international and regional milieu as 
well.  
Given the salience of worldwide youth activism, and the rise of different protest 
movements over the past decade, ranging from toppling down authoritarian regimes in 
East Europe to the Arab spring to occupy movements in the western developed part of the 
world; Inglehart since the 1970s argued that there is a sweeping generational value 
change towards postmaterialist values of self-expression, quality of life and belonging 
given the changing nature of societies, where economic security deceases much of the 
constraints on human minds, thus opting for post-material sort of values.  Hence, values 
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of gender and sexual equality in addition to the rise of environmentalism were expected 
to take place all over the world.  
Assessing the current status of such values, I constructed a world values map from 
2010 and 2014 to detect such growing trend based on Inglehart‟s earlier work started in 
early 2000s. However, my analysis used a geographical categorization rather than 
Inglehart‟s cultural zones units. Geographically, such values are present in the developed 
northern hemisphere of the world. Following North America and Western Europe, South 
East Asia provides support for such changing context of world values. However the 
Middle East scores least on Inglehart‟s dimensions (Secularism and Self-Expression), 
even below many Latin American and African states. 
Egypt as part of the Middle East as showed in both world and regional maps falls 
among the lowest scoring countries on dimensions of postmaterialism, although there is 
some deviant cases like Tunisia, Iraq, and Lebanon. This part of the world still raises 
Inglehart‟s concerns with persistence of cultural traits and its relative singularity. 
Projecting such thesis on the Egyptian case, we find little support for such thesis. Other 
than being one of the lowest scoring countries in the world and the region on preferring 
such values, Egyptian emphasis on postmaterialist values are moving backward since 
early 2000s. This in part has to do with economic stagnation the country is facing 
following the 2011 uprising, but also shed the light on the uneven distribution of income 
within the country even during economic growth by the mid-2000s. Such fining opens the 
door for investigating long-term versus short-term effects of economic progression on 
value change in developing states such as Egypt.  
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Egyptian youth give more emphasis on postmaterialism in relation to older 
cohorts, thus there some evidence on existing cohort differences, however their 
international and regional peers particularly following the Arab spring reflects more solid 
emphasis on such new values according to Inglehart‟s scholarship. High income and 
education levels explain the propensity for such values among Egyptian youth. Other 
evidences for cohort differences are found when analyzing basic political and social 
attitudes such as political efficacy and gender tolerance, however much of these 
emphases are due to intra-cohort changes, rather than generational replacement per se. 
 During the past four years in Egypt, attitudes are found fluctuating, thus it needs 
more time and surveys to detect profound generational value differences employing 
longitudinal analysis technique. I believe that although results show little support for 
Inglehart‟s thesis, one cannot disregard its effects, as Egyptian youth proved through the 
analysis to be fragmented based on different predictors, mainly demographic ones. 
Results of postmaterialism regression showed that such values are function of high 
education and income and masculinity.  
Other, youth according to the study above are divided based on different social, political 
and demographic factors. Urbanism is the prevalent factor that explains much of the 
liberal attitudes in Egypt, where being urban means showing more support for democracy 
and gender equality, and it means less support for political Islam and authoritarian 
attitudes. Being a male explains support for democracy, with more confidence in one‟s 
political leverage, and support for postmaterialist values, expect for the case for gender 
equality that is mainly supported by females. Education plays an important role in giving 
more emphasis among youth on postmaterialism and political activism during the past 
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years following the 2011 uprising. Other religious values like piety explains propensity 
among youth for political Islam in various ways over different waves in Egypt. However, 
we draw a distinction between individual religiously and communal religious practices in 
explaining political activism in Egypt during the post-2011 epoch, where the latter is 
found to have more power in explaining political activism.  These findings further 
support our doubt on the homogenous nature of Egyptian youth and their related liberal 
nature as many of Middle East democracy scholars argued before. Hence, features of 
post-2011 political polarization and organization might be explained by our earlier 
mentioned findings on the fragmented nature of Egyptian youth.  
5.2 Arab Spring and Value Change 
This section aims to project the study‟s findings on Arab Spring events and 
related value change. Scholars and commentators have been emphasizing the liberal and 
tolerant nature of current Egyptian youth who led the popular mobilization against 
Mubarak in 2011, resulting in his step down. Results actually cast doubt regarding the 
progressive nature of current Egyptian youth. However, other findings provides an insight 
on the illiberal and less secular nature of politically active Egyptians who may be have 
been underestimated by foreign commentators when it comes to describe Egyptian youth. 
Adding double-faced dimensions from factors affecting political activism and political 
efficacy values, I can argue that the model for Egyptians who have been politically active 
over the past years following the 2011 events are marked by urbanism, high education, 
interested in politics and less piety. It actually matches many of the arguments of the 
young generation portrayed in western circles, however their leverage in the society is 
what we cast doubt for.  
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Moreover, results from previous chapters with little evidence shows that young 
Egyptians are more dissatisfied with their respective political regimes, with a low degree 
of political trust. Thus, indicating a general trend of dissatisfaction with the status quo 
and urge for political change, however, pious young Egyptians show more support for 
political Islam which in turn means less support for democracy, and gender equality. 
Moreover, young pious Egyptians showed higher levels of political interest and efficacy, 
thus the scope of change towards liberal settings in post-2011 arrangements requires 
additional investigation. This is related to the MB rule in Egypt for while the AB III 
survey was being collected in early 2013.  
Moreover, and most surprisingly pro-authoritarian attitudes explains much of the 
support for democracy among Egyptian youth in post-2011 settings. It means that 
democracy in the western conception in terms of rotation of power through elections is 
not fully shared by young Egyptians . This takes back to Jamal, Tessler and Hoffman‟s 
conception of illiberal democracy spread in MENA. Empirical evidence from the AB has 
showed repeatedly that democracy for Arabs is procedural rather than normative per se.  
Thus, I can argue that young Egyptians who were active through social media and 
led protests on the eve of 25
th
 of January reflects that type of liberal politically active 
young people and show postmaterialist propensities as well as Juan Cole and Esposito 
argued before. However those who took over the scene afterwards hold different set of 
traditional values as Religion proved to explain much of the variance in relation to 
democracy and gender equality. Different features of social and political conservatism 
were there in post-2011 and arguably supported by Egyptian youth. One example is the 
election of MB members both for parliament and presidency. However, this study did not 
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account for the role of Islamist youth in particular in post-Tahrir arrangements.  This 
study is different, as it provides an empirical insight on youth changing values in the 
Middle East and Egyptian society. It opens the door for democracy scholars to study this 
historic bulge from a generational point of view rather than treating them as one bloc. 
Moreover, it shows that conservatism is a growing trend in the region and it explains 
much of the variance in regards to conservational issues and basic human rights and 
freedom. Moreover, it allows for qualitative study on the profiles of different Egyptians, 
thus treating the January 25
th
 events in isolation from the January 28
th
 supporters and 
later forms of youth political associations. It takes democratic aspirations in the region to 
ground, thus exploring other questions that might be actually center to the future of Egypt 
and the Middle East, most importantly the question of political Islam. 
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Appendix A 
Traditional versus Secular-Rational Values 
World Values Survey: Wave 6 (2010-2014) 
 
1- How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate. 10 mean 
“very important” and 1 means “not at all important.” 
 
2- Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, 
if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five, 
where 1=mentioned, 0=not mentioned  
- Independence   
- Determination and perseverance  
- Religious faith  
- Obedience  
 
3- Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between: “Abortion” on a scale from 
1-10. 10 means always justifiable  
  
4- How proud are you to be (Nationality), on a scale from 1-4, 1 means very proud 
 
 
5- I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take 
place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether 
you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind? (Greater 
respect for authority) on scale from 1-3, where 3 is bad.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
033 
 
Appendix B 
Survival versus Self-Expression Values 
World Values Survey: Wave 6 (2010-2014) 
 
1- Materialism/Postmaterialism 4-Item Index:  
If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most 
important? (Two choices; first and second) 
- Maintaining order in the nation (M) 
- Give people more say (PM) 
- Fighting rising prices (M) 
- Protecting freedom of speech (PM) 
 
2- Taking all things together, would you say you are happy? Scale on 1-4, 1 means 
very happy. 
 
3- Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between: “Homosexuality” on a scale 
from 1-10. 10 means always justifiable  
 
4- Now I‟d like you to look at this card. I‟m going to read out some forms of 
political action that people can take, and I‟d like you to tell me, for each one, 
whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would 
never under any circumstances do it “Signing Petition,” 1= did, 2= might do, 
3=would never do 
 
5- Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful 
in dealing with people? 1=most people can be trusted, 2=need to be very careful  
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Appendix C 
World Cultural Map at 2000 
Source: Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and 
Democracy: The Human Development Sequence, Cambridge: University Press, 
2005, p. 63. 
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Appendix D 
Table: Mean Scores of Countries on Dimensions of Cultural Variations Sorted by 
Highest Loads on Survival/ Self-Expression Values 
 
World Values Survey: Wave 6 (2010-2014) 
Country Survival /Self-Expression  Traditional /Secular-Rational  N 
Sweden 2.0291 0.542 1022 
Netherlands 1.6132 0.4113 1610 
Australia 1.4983 -0.0694 1389 
New Zealand 1.4093 -0.0021 459 
Germany 1.0534 0.5435 1761 
Japan 0.9758 0.926 1395 
Slovenia 0.9472 0.6313 762 
Spain 0.9058 0.3345 976 
United States 0.833 -0.1699 2032 
Uruguay 0.6676 0.0024 705 
Singapore 0.5529 0.0896 1962 
Estonia 0.3183 1.1317 1223 
Chile 0.3014 0.0405 852 
Taiwan 0.2869 0.952 1080 
Mexico 0.271 -0.9201 1933 
South Korea 0.2649 0.7647 1138 
Belarus 0.1911 0.5854 1300 
China 0.1707 0.9127 1452 
Uzbekistan 0.1505 -0.8609 1334 
Poland 0.1256 -0.0567 786 
Cyprus -0.0076 0.0677 915 
Philippines -0.0314 -0.5622 1177 
Colombia -0.0366 -0.9486 1442 
Peru -0.0777 -0.3507 1039 
Qatar -0.1254 -1.2734 1046 
Russia -0.1436 0.7208 1751 
Lebanon -0.1869 0.3061 1059 
Ecuador -0.2278 -0.815 1192 
Kazakhstan -0.234 0.2967 1494 
Trinidad &Tobago -0.2546 -0.9264 927 
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Country  Survival /Self-Expression Traditional /Secular-Rational N 
Rwanda -0.334 -0.3677 1521 
Ukraine -0.3458 0.8502 1336 
Kyrgyzstan -0.3657 0.1132 1414 
Algeria -0.3751 -0.0918 899 
Turkey -0.3936 -0.2496 1415 
Malaysia -0.4092 -0.2122 1282 
Romania -0.4231 0.2291 1289 
Pakistan -0.4504 -0.3016 1174 
Nigeria -0.4715 -0.3892 1758 
Zimbabwe -0.5386 -0.3928 1493 
Libya -0.5968 -0.5777 1790 
Armenia -0.6101 0.0197 927 
Azerbaijan -0.6525 0.0884 1000 
Palestine -0.681 -0.0655 899 
Ghana -0.6962 -0.7684 1550 
Iraq -0.7304 0.038 1070 
Yemen -0.7543 -0.254 609 
Morocco -0.8698 -0.0581 915 
Tunisia -0.8824 0.0326 1028 
Jordan -0.915 -0.3479 1162 
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Appendix E 
Materialist/Postmaterialist 12-item Value Index 
World Values Survey: Waves 4, 5, 6 (2001- 2008- 2012) 
 
1- Materialism/Postmaterialism 4-Item Index 
 
2- People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next 
ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would 
give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider 
the most important? (Two choices; first and second):  
- A high level of economic growth (M) 
- A strong defense forces (M) 
- People have more say about how things (M) 
- Trying to make our cities more beautiful (PM) 
 
3- Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important? (Two 
choices; first and second) : 
- A stable economy (M) 
- Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society (PM) 
- Ideas count more than money (PM) 
- The fight against crime (M) 
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Appendix F 
Table: Mean Scores of (16-30) age category by Materialist/Postmaterialist 12-item Index 
during 2010 and 2014 by Country Sorted by Highest Loads on Mean Column 
 
Source: World Values Survey: Wave 6 (2010-2014) 
Country  Mean  Sample Size 
Sweden 2.81 213 
Germany 2.76 175 
Slovenia 2.71 157 
Chile 2.68 244 
Spain 2.47 244 
Uruguay 2.45 229 
South Korea 2.43 231 
Philippines 2.42 235 
Colombia 2.39 326 
Japan 2.32 105 
Poland 2.32 212 
Mexico 2.3 416 
Netherlands 2.3 92 
Romania 2.21 226 
Singapore 2.21 254 
Turkey 2.18 296 
New Zealand 2.17 92 
Ecuador 2.14 364 
United States 2.14 221 
Estonia 2.11 237 
Australia 2.1 229 
Peru 2.1 344 
Lebanon 2.08 339 
Zimbabwe 2.08 453 
Algeria 2.07 349 
Nigeria 2.01 600 
Taiwan 2 236 
Qatar 1.98 326 
Malaysia 1.96 296 
Belarus 1.95 249 
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Country  Mean N 
Cyprus 1.93 332 
Azerbaijan 1.9 335 
Ukraine 1.88 252 
Palestine 1.78 401 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.78 249 
Libya 1.77 445 
Morocco 1.73 352 
Iraq 1.68 375 
Kyrgyzstan 1.68 341 
Russian Federation 1.68 249 
Ghana 1.64 581 
Uzbekistan 1.59 270 
Kazakhstan 1.55 348 
Rwanda 1.55 466 
China 1.51 234 
Armenia 1.5 217 
Jordan 1.41 313 
Yemen 1.16 427 
Egypt 1.08 396 
Tunisia 1.07 403 
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Appendix G 
Interest in Politics 
World Values Survey: Waves 4, 5, and 6 
(2001, 2008, and 2012)  
 
- How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you (read out and code one 
answer): 
1-  Very interested 
2- Somewhat interested 
3- Not very interested 
4- Not at all interested 
 
Appendix H 
Political Trust Index (PTI) 
Arab Barometer Wave II: Egypt 2011 
 
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Citizens 
must support the government‟s decisions even if they disagree with them”? 
1- I strongly agree 
2-  I agree 
3- I disagree 
4- I strongly disagree 
 
- Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Government employees 
are aware of citizens‟ needs 
1- I strongly agree 
2-  I agree 
3- I disagree 
4- I strongly disagree 
 
- Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Political leaders are 
concerned with the needs of ordinary citizens 
1- I strongly agree 
2-  I agree 
3- I disagree 
4- I strongly disagree 
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- Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? the government takes the 
opinions of citizens seriously 
1- I strongly agree 
2-  I agree 
3- I disagree 
4- I strongly disagree 
Appendix I 
Political Efficacy 
Arab Barometer Wave II: Egypt 2011 
 
- Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Sometimes, politics are 
so complicated that I cannot understand what is happening 
1- I strongly agree 
2-  I agree 
3- I disagree 
4- I strongly disagree 
Appendix J 
Pro-Authoritarian Attitudes 
Arab Barometer Waves II: Egypt 2011  
 
- I will describe different political systems to you, and I want to ask you about your 
opinion of each one of them with regard to the country‟s governance – for each 
one would you say it is very good, good, bad, or very bad? A democratic political 
system (ensures public freedoms, equality in political and civil rights, devolution 
of authority, and accountability and transparency of the executive authority)   
1- Very Good 
2- Good 
3- Bad 
4- Very Bad 
 
- I will describe different political systems to you, and I want to ask you about your 
opinion of each one of them with regard to the country‟s governance – for each 
one would you say it is very good, good, bad, or very bad? A political system with 
an authoritarian president (non-democratic) who is indifferent to parliament and 
elections (Reversed)  
1- Very Good 
2- Good 
3- Bad 
4- Very Bad 
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Appendix K 
Satisfaction with Political System  
Arab Barometer Waves II: Egypt 2011  
 
- I will name a number of institutions, and I would like you to tell me to what 
extent  you trust each of them: the Armed Forces-Reversed  
1- I trust it to a great extent 
2- I trust it to a medium extent 
3- I trust it to a limited extent 
4- I absolutely do not trust it 
 
- I will name a number of institutions, and I would like you to tell me to what 
extent you trust each of them: The government (the cabinet)-Reversed  
1- I trust it to a great extent 
2- I trust it to a medium extent 
3- I trust it to a limited extent 
4- I absolutely do not trust it 
 
Appendix L 
Pro-Democratic Orientations 
Arab Barometer Waves II and III: Egypt 2011 and 2013 
 
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Under a 
democratic system, the country‟s economic performance is weak (Reversed)  
1- I strongly agree 
2-  I agree 
3- I disagree 
4- I strongly disagree 
 
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Democratic regimes are indecisive and full of problems (Reversed)  
1- I strongly agree 
2- I agree 
3- I disagree 
4- I strongly disagree 
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- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability (Reversed)  
1- I strongly agree 
2-  I agree 
3- I disagree 
4- I strongly disagree 
 
 
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? A 
democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems 
1- I strongly agree 
2-  I agree 
3- I disagree 
4- I strongly disagree 
 
 
 
Appendix M 
Support for Political Islam  
Arab Barometer Waves II and III: Egypt 2011 and 2013 
 
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Religious 
leaders (imams, preachers, priests) should not interfere in voters‟ decisions in 
elections 
1- I strongly agree 
2- I agree 
3- I disagree 
4- I strongly disagree 
 
- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Your 
country is better off if religious people hold public positions in the state -Reversed 
1- I strongly agree 
2- I agree 
3- I disagree 
4- I strongly disagree 
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- To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Religious 
leaders (imams, preachers, priests) should have influence over government 
decisions-Reversed 
1- I strongly agree 
2- I agree 
3- I disagree 
4- I strongly disagree 
 
Appendix N 
Piety Measure 
Arab Barometer Waves II and III:  Egypt 2011 and 2013 
 
- Do you “Listen to or read the Quran”? -Reversed 
1- Always 
2- Most of the time 
3- Sometimes 
4- Rarely  
 
Appendix O 
Government Distrust 
Arab Barometer Waves II and III: Egypt 2011 and 2013 
 
- I will name a number of institutions, and I would like you to tell me to what 
extent you trust each of them: The government-Reversed  
1- I trust it to a great extent 
2- I trust it to a medium extent 
3- I trust it to a limited extent 
4- I absolutely do not trust it 
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Appendix P 
Arab Spring Political Activism 
Arab Barometer Waves III: Egypt 2013 
 
- Here is a set of activities that citizens usually take part in. During the past three 
years, did you attend a meeting to discuss a subject or sign a petition? (Reversed) 
1- Once 
2- More than once 
3- I have never participated  
 
- Here is a set of activities that citizens usually take part in. During the past three 
years, did you participate in a protest, march or sit-in? (Reversed) 
1- Once 
2- More than once 
3- I have never participated  
 
Appendix Q 
Islamic Communal Practice 
Arab Barometer Waves III: Egypt 2013 
 
- Do you “Attend Friday prayer”? -Reversed 
1- Always 
2- Most of the time 
3- Sometimes 
4- Rarely 
Appendix R 
Gender Equality 
Arab Barometer Waves II and III: Egypt 2011 and 2013 
 
- I will read a set of statements that relate to the status of women in our society to 
you in order to gauge the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each 
statement: “A married woman can work outside the home” –Reversed 
1- I strongly agree 
2- I agree 
3- I disagree 
4- I strongly disagree 
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- I will read a set of statements that relate to the status of women in our society to 
you in order to gauge the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each 
statement: “In general, men are better at political leadership than women”  
1- I strongly agree 
2- I agree 
3- I disagree 
4- I strongly disagree 
 
 
- I will read a set of statements that relate to the status of women in our society to 
you in order to gauge the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each 
statement: “University education for males is more important than university 
education for females”  
1- I strongly agree 
2- I agree 
3- I disagree 
4- I strongly disagree 
Appendix S 
Anti-western feelings  
Arab Barometer Waves II and III: Egypt 2011 and 2013 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “The United States‟ interference in the 
region justifies armed operations against the United States everywhere.” (Reversed)  
1- I strongly agree 
2- I agree 
3- I disagree 
4- I strongly disagree 
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